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Living aquatic resources, predominantly fish and other aquatic animals, contribute substan- 
dy  to food security and livelihood in the countries  of  the Mekong River basin. The wetlands habitats 
that support the renewal and abundance of  fish and other aquatic life also provide many other important 
environmental services. However, maintaining the contribution of  the wetlands to human food supply 
and their continued ecological integrity is becoming more and more dficult.  Increasing human popula- 
tion and growing competitive uses for land and water resources, often advanced from different sectoral 
viewpoints, are crowding out previous practices and opportunities.  A  comprehensive approach to man- 
agement of the wetlands of  the region provides great challenges since the river, its tributaries and flood- 
plains cut across several national boundaries; the biological resources themselves are complex (with more 
than a thousand species of fish plus other aquatic organisms, forests, ricefields, mangroves, etc.); and 
people representing different sectors, disciplines and goals have to contribute to the solutions. 
Against this background, it was most appropriate that a panel representing some of  the key stake- 
holders in the development of  the region considered the conflicts, competition and cooperation in the 
Mekong "commons." The emphasis in the report is on "common property", the bounty it represents and 
the identification of  the strains and stresses in managing these common resources in the future  for the 
good of all. ICLARM has an  interest in these issues in general, and in the Mekong region in particular, as 
the process of  development, conservation and equitable use of  aquatic resources are interdependent. We 
are grateful to all our partners in the development of  this book, especially the Australian Mekong Re- 
source Centre and the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida).  We  believe that the book will 
be of  value to all the national and international  agencies concerned with the development of  the Mekong 
River region Cooperation  between these agencies with the interest and capacity to respond to the issues 
raised in the book is the key to maintaining the sustainability  of  the aquatic resources of  the Mekong 
region, and protecting and improving the livelihood of  the people who depend upon them. 
Meryl J. Williams 
Director General 
International  Center for Living 
Aquatic Resources Mangement - 
The World Fish Center PREFACE 
The Mekong, the world's twelfth largest river, is the target for major development interven- 
tions, such as hydropower generation and large-scale water diversion, that will no doubt alter its 
diverse ecosystem and have significant consequences for its inhabitants. After several decades of 
national, regional and international conflicts in the region, attention is now being focused on har- 
nessing the resources of the Mekong basin through development  interventions. Regional and inter- 
national agreements, such as the Mekong River Commission established in 1995, have already laid 
the basis for some of  the major development efforts in the riparian countries. It is understood that 
changes in the river basin are inevitable. Only the form they take and when they occur can be 
managed. The mighty Mekong, which has shaped the pattern of  settlement over several hundred 
years by creating a vast natural resource base and providing the primary basis of  livelihood for the 
people, will have its own shape changed. 
With many dsvelopment agendas on the table, the future of  the resources and the people of  the 
basin are at a crossroads. An informed basis for development decisions is vital, as it will determine 
if  and how the local, national and regional impact of  development should be viewed. This volume 
contains the papers presented in a panel session on Conflicts, Competition and Cooperation in the Mekong 
Commons: Feeding People and Protecting Natural Resources, during the Seventh Conference of  the In- 
ternational Association for the Study of  Common Property entitled Crossing Boundaries held on 
10-14 June 1998 at the University of  British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. It provides an analysis 
of  the common property perspective of  the basin's natural resources and raises the issues of  subsis- 
tence and sustainability stemming from development interventions. 
The editors would like to thank the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
for their financial support in publishing this report.  In addition, they would like to thank 
Peter R.  Gardiner, Deputy-Director General of ICLARM, for the substantive contributions, and 
Mylene Lorica and Bing V. Santos of  ICLARM for providing technical assistance. 
The Editors INTRODUCTION Conflict, Competition and Cooperation 
in the Mekong Commons: Feeding People 
and Protecting Natural Resources" 
Mahfuzuddin Ahmed1  and Philip Hirsch* 
' International  Center for hng  Aquatic Resources Management - The World Fish Center, P.O.  Box 500, GPO,  106  70 Penang Malaysia 
Australian Mekong Resource Centre, Department ofGeography,  Sydney Universty, NSW  2006, Australia 
AHMED, M. and P. HIRSCH.  2000. Conflict, competition and cooperation in the Mekong  commons: feeding people and protecting  natural resources, 
p. 3-7. In M. Ahmed and P. Hirsch (eds.) Common property  in the Mekong: issues of sustainability and subsistence. ICLARM Stud. Rev. 26,67 p. 
Introduction 
The Mekong River basin covers nearly 800 000 krn2 
and is home to more than 65 million people. The wa- 
ters of  the Mekong have shaped the pattern of  human 
settlement in the region and created a vast natural 
resource base that has historically  provided the 
primary basis of  rural livelihood. Regarded as one of 
the earth's most diverse and productive ecosystems, 
the Mekong basin also provides a common cultural 
heritage for the people who have lived in the basin for 
centuries. The basin now covers parts of  the territory 
of  Burma, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Vietnam and 
the Yunnan Province of  China (Fig. 1). The political 
division of  the basin has, over many decades, given 
rise to different perspectives on its economic, social and 
environmental significance. The differences have 
increased with the different levels of  economic devel- 
opment, geopolitical history and geographic location 
of  the countries and the relative importance  of  the river 
basin in each country. 
While there have been differences over the use 
of  the Mekong basin's resources, there is also a long 
history of  attempts to create a common vision.  Since 
the establishment of  the Mekong Committee in the 
1950s, the economic potential of  the Mekong River has 
been assessed in terms of  hydropower development, 
water diversion  and irrigation, logging, navigation, 
fisheries and tourism.  Recent initiatives under the 
Asian Development Bank's Greater Mekong Subregion 
program and under other bilateral and multilateral 
schemes have targeted the Mekong for large-scale 
infrastructure development. It has been suggested that 
the water in the Mekong and its tributaries can be used 
to generate 285 400 GWh of  electrical energy annually 
(MRC 1997) and that the rivers have the potential to 
- 
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irrigate several million hectares of  agricultural land. 
Such large-scale development is put forward as the key 
to prosperity and to enhancing food security for the 
inhabitants of  the basin. 
However, if  these gains are looked at in relation 
to households and communities dependent on the 
basin's  natural resources, the net gain appears less 
attractive or, at best, uncertain for the majority of  the 
poor and disadvantaged people in the basin. The costs 
of  the Mekong development agenda are manifest at 
the local level, where the livelihood and environmen- 
tal impact of  infrastructure development are felt most 
immediately. The current challenge for sustainable 
development  of  the basin is to reconcile local interests, 
common to the majority of  the basin's  farmers and 
fishers, with the broader development vision. 
The Mekong Commons 
The prospect of  large-scale development is predi- 
cated on the exploitation of  the Mekong basin as a 
shared resource. Geopolitical tensions that previously 
precluded a shared developmental vision have eased. 
The 1995 Agreement for the Sustainable Development 
of  the Mekong River Basin, which is the basis for the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC),  is based on the joint 
use of  water and other resources of  the basin by the six 
riparian countries. The Mekong basin commons are 
regarded as a hitherto unexploited resource to be har- 
nessed for economic development. 
There is another level at which the Mekong com- 
mons are affected by  the rapid development of  the 
basin's resources. Local common property is both di- 
rectly and indirectly impacted by infrastructure devel- 
opment, the growth of  commercial production, new 
property relations and a myriad of  other changes af- 
fecting the region. The fact that the water, fishery, land 
and forest resources are common property leads to their 
appropriation and exploitation without due concern However, agriculture continues to employ the 
majority of  the population in Thailand, and the recent eco- 
nomic downturn  has reinforced the sigruficance of the rural 
resource base as a safety net for the poorer sections of 
society. 
Fisheries are another important use of  the basin's 
rivers and wetlands that are home to many aquatic re- 
sources. Fish is an important staple in the diet of  local 
people in all these countries. In Cambodia, some re- 
cent findings suggest that per capita consumption of 
fresh and processed fish is nearly 75 kg per annum for 
the communities living in and around the waterways, 
rivers, lakes and floodlands (Ahmed et al. 1999). Total 
fish production for inland capture fisheries in the ri- 
parian countries is estimated at up to one million tons 
per year although estimates vary between sources 
(MRC 1992; Jensen 1996; Van Zalinge et al., this vol.). 
Aquatic resources, thus, play a major role in the 
Mekong basin.  Aquatic supplies come from various 
types of  interrelated environments, i.e., permanent 
water (river, lake, etc.), permanent and seasonal 
backswamps, flooded forests, grasslands, receding 
waters, inundated ricefields and seasonally flooded crop 
fields. This  common  property  and its  ability 
to supply a large amount of aquatic products are 
being neglected in the ongoing development debate 
on the Mekong region.  Current knowledge of  the 
economic and nutritional value of  aquatic products 
such as fish (capture and culture), wildlife, plants and 
vegetables is still inadequate to estimate the "true" 
value of  the aquatic resources of the "commons" in the 
Mekong basin. 
Besides the direct benefits from the products and 
services, many of  the indirect benefits and functions 
also have an economic value that is sigruficant locally 
and also for the population as a whole. For instance, 
groundwater recharge and fertile soil deposits through 
floods maintain the fertility and productivity of  the 
land.  These benefits and functions of  the ecosystem 
are not often considered in development that interferes 
with natural cycles of  floods. 
Conflict or Cooperation in the Commons? 
The notion of  "commons" implies shared interests 
based on a degree of  common vision. The commons have 
also been associated with discord, most notably inHardin's 
(1968) metaphor of  commons as a tragedy for the natural 
resource base. In this volume, we attempt to show the 
significance of  the commons for the well-being of  most 
people who make their livelihood from the Mekong River 
basin. We  also discuss how undermining  of  the commons 
through poor analysis and neglect can threaten this. The 
Mekong commons are a source of  well-being based on 
the cooperative use of  resources, but are also a site of  ac- 
tual and impending conflict. 
Like many other river basins around the world, the 
floodplains of  the Mekong River and its major tributaries 
have  also  attracted  and  supported  a  large 
human population relative to the lightly settled hin- 
terland. The basin's natural resources, fertile land and 
water provide an abundant livelihood for subsistence 
in a mainly peasant society. The delta in southeastern 
Cambodia and Vietnam has a particularly high popu- 
lation density.  At the national level, the basin is sig- 
nificant for all  the lower riparian countries. In Cambodia 
and Lao PDR, about 85%  of  the national territory of  each 
country lies within the basin, so that it is the dominant 
resource system for these two largely agrarian states. In 
Vietnam, the delta only forms 10%  of  the national area 
but produces about half of  its rice crop, vital both for food 
security and for Vietnam's status as the world's third larg- 
est rice exporter. For Thailand, the basin is part of  the 
country's poorest regions in the northeast. 
The situation of northeasternThailand is symptom- 
atic of  the more general concern that development  in the 
basin has lagged behind other areas and the gains from 
economic development in the basin have not been 
concomitant with the resources it has provided for the 
overall economic development  of  the region. The loss of 
biological and ecological wealth, such as the forest cover, 
fishstocks, species diversity and wildlife of  the basin (MRC 
1997), has been felt mainly by  those traditionally 
dependent on these resources, while the fruits of  economic 
growth have been reaped elsewhere. This is evident from 
the widening income gap between the northeastern and 
central parts of Thailand, and the relatively poor social and 
economic conditions of  the people living in some pockets 
of  the Mekong delta as compared to the other parts of  the 
country (MRC 1997). 
Changing  perspectives towards development also 
influence policies  that affect the basin's  natural 
resources. With a trend toward the development of mar- 
ket economies that measures human welfare only in terms 
of  marketed services and production of  manufactured 
goods, natural goods and services will systematically 
receive inadequate  weight in policy decisions that concern 
the use, appropriation  and alteration of  natural resources 
(Costanza  1997).  A certain perception of  the national in- 
terest has often overridden livelihood concerns in policy 
perspectives towards the resources and environment in 
the basin (Hirsch 1996). 
Economic development,  combined with a high rate 
of  population growth and high dependency ratios, has 
led to an ever-growing set of  demands on water, land, 
forests and fisheries of  the basin. Competition for these 
limited resources from a growing number of  users and 
other claimants is exacerbated by  competitive 
and incompatible use of  resources by  new types of 
activities  For  example, increasing the number of 
subsistence  fishers on particular stretches of  the river is 
accompanied by market development that places new de- 
mands on limited stocks, while environmental  threats to the same stocks arise with upstream hydropower and 
water diversion projects. Therefore, we find pressures 
within the local commons as well as pressures on these 
commons from outside. 
A reevaluation of  the true value of  the common 
property resources will help to set proper priorities in 
the planning process, including the need for fair and 
just compensation to people whose access to and use 
of common property resources might be threatened by 
development plans. There is solid evidence to show 
that a much larger aquatic production is available  from 
these resources than reported in official statistics (Deap et 
al. 1998; Ahmed et al. 1999; Guttman 1999).  Use of  market 
price and marketed quantities  as the sole criterion for valu- 
ing the resources and their products results in the under- 
valuing of  aquatic resources relative to other uses of  the 
river and its floodplains. The subsistence and dietary im- 
portance of fish is ignored when the focus is on the com- 
mercial value of  large-scale development plans. For 
instance, the large value attached to hydropower projects 
in Lao PDR is the result of  the high projected demand for 
electricity for the industrial sector in Thailand. 
The single-sector development orientation is the re- 
sult of  a lack of  public participation in policy development 
and decisionmaking. only  through bringing the public into 
the dialogue  will it be possible to capture  intersectoral and 
nonmarket values in common property resources man- 
agement. Incompatibilities  between local, national and 
regonal priorities have also resulted in the undervaluing 
of  many uses and services of  the basin's natural resources. 
Political pressures and donor influence have resulted in 
overlapping  jurisdictions over the resources. There is of- 
ten a lack of  coordination  between agencies, and donor's 
priorities do not always match the priorities of  national 
and local agencies. 
Subsistence, Sustainability 
and Development 
Against the backdrop of  the confhcts described above, 
the vast majority of  the basin's Inhabitants who are still 
subsistence farmers and fishers are now threatened by 
intensive agriculture, logging and hydropower develop 
ment. The hypothesis that irrigation  and other forms of 
agricultural intensification are vital to increased food sup- 
ply, in view of  fast declining area of  unused arable land 
and rapid increase in population, is gaining credence 
amongst development  planners and policymakers. How- 
ever, the impact of  this on environmental integrity, the 
production and supply of  wetland and aquatic goods and 
services, the gender division of  labor, property rights, food 
security and equity are not well understood. 
Central to the issues of  subsistence and sustainability 
in the commons in the Mekong basin is the utilization of 
the waters of  the Mekong, the single most important com- 
mon resource (MRC 1998). Development decisions often 
simpbfy the issue in terms of: (i)  the potentd conflicts aris- 
ing from water scarcity on the mainstream river in the 
dry season; and (ii)  the need to manage high river flows 
during the wet season. The question of  how to protect 
other users and the ecosystem from the effects of  water 
utilization is treated only as peripheral.  Most of  the ongo- 
ing efforts are centered around reaching an agreement 
among the riparian countries on abiding by a set of  rules 
for the use of  water,,covering  both quality and quantity. 
These rules do not necessarily conform to the needs and 
aspirations of  the majority of  the inhabitants of  the basin 
nor do they take into account the multiple effects on the 
environment in a wide range of  cultural, social, economic 
and ecological settings. 
Another key element in incorporating the commons 
into development debates in the basin is the very basis by 
which agreements are being worked out amongs the ri- 
parian countries at the regional level and the definition of 
what is deemed as acceptable  action by individual coun- 
tries. Each country  has the opportunity to exercise sover- 
eign power and independence, provided it keeps the 
impact of  development decisions and actions within the 
bounds of  change acceptable to the others.  This may be 
seen as a satisfactory arrangement by the governments 
in dealing with commons. However, given the cultural, 
ethnic and socioeconomic diversity and the political and 
economic strengths and weaknesses of  the various groups 
within each country, it is naive to assume that local com- 
mons will be protected by national level decisions once 
national and regional issues are dealt with fairly and justly. 
In view of  the paucity of  data, lack of  communica tion, lim- 
ited and imperfect mechanisms for dialogue and consul- 
tation over the commons within the existing political 
framework, the shared development agenda at the re- 
gional level has the consequence of decreasing the in- 
fluence of  weaker groups in the decision-making process. 
With growing  material aspirations, population pres- 
sure and increasing requirement of  food and other basic 
necessities, the basin is faced with the twin challenges of 
feeding its people and protecting its natural resources. It 
is critical to identdy the technological, policy and institu- 
tional options that can meet these challenges. This re- 
quires: (i) the use of  a multisectoral and interagency 
strategy for development and management; (ii)  manage- 
ment of  resources through an ecosystem (e.g.,  wetlands) 
approach rather than through production maximization; 
(iii)  integration of  intersectoral policies and institutional 
governance of  the resources; (iv) recognition of  local 
rights over the common resources and involvement of 
communities  and stakeholders in the basin's develop- 
ment; and (v)  use of  environmental and ecological ap- 
proaches to economic indicators,  such as natural resource 
accounting rather than conventional economic growth. 
All of  these require a proper understanding and valua- 
tion of  the role of  the commons at different levels. 
The articles that follow focus on conflicts, competi- 
tion and cooperation over shared water and aquatic re- resource issues. However, the problem is so urgent that  sources, and on problems and possibilities of  optimizing 
the benefits from the natural resources in the wetlands at 
the regional and local levels. Particular emphasis is given 
to the legal and institutional  policies governing  common 
property and natural resources such as water, flooded for- 
ests and fisheries. The regional focus is on the lower 
Mekong basin. In the local context, the implications  of  a 
market-oriented approach to establishment of  resource 
access and use rights are examined, The role of  commu- 
nity-based approaches  and integration  of common and 
private property based resource management are as- 
sessed. 
The book has two parts. The first part consists of 
three overview papers. The first of  these considers the 
role and limitations of  the Mekong River Agreement. 
The second paper looks at the significance of  the is- 
sues at the local, national and regional levels. The third 
looks at the institutional and legal perspectives on the 
management of  the basin's resources. 
The second part consists of  three case studies. Two 
of  these studies relate to Cambodian  fisheries. The first 
study outlines the ecological and social problems in 
the management of  this highly important common 
property resource, and suggests that assumptions of 
plenty are no longer valid. The implication is that new 
means of  defining access rights by rural Cambodians 
are a prerequisite to protecting both the resource itself 
and the livelihood of  those who depend on it. The sec- 
ond study cautions that the fishing lot system, inequi- 
table as it may seem, has its roots in the structure of 
rural Cambodian society and, hence, should be adapted 
rather than dispensed with in favor of simplistic com- 
munity-based management approaches.  The third 
study analyzes a pilot scheme on community manage- 
ment of  watershed resources in Lao PDR. 
This collection does not seek to be comprehensive in 
its coverage of  the issues concerning the commons.  It fo- 
cuses selectively on certain aspects of  common property 
to highlight specific dilemmas surrounding shared re- 
sources in the context of  rapid development. A  fuller treat- 
ment would require a much larger compendium, given 
the diversity of  the basin and the complexity of  shared 
anv discussion of  the issues is warranted -  ifonlvro stimu- 
J  J 
late further debates on the development  options facing 
the basin, its constituent  economies, cultures and ecosys- 
tems. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the risk of  serious damage resulting from the development and 
exploitation of  natural resources in international watersheds. Specifically,  it focuses on the lower Mekong 
River basin where water is an indispensable andvaluable asset. It scrutinizes the risk of  ecological damage 
and the absence of  public participation in the development plamhgpxws. It assesses the implications of 
the 199.5 Mekong River Commission Agreement for the two core countries in the lower Mekong River basin, 
Lao PDR and Cambodla. 
Introduction 
In the early 1990s, increasing attention was given 
globally to the implications of the potential scarcity of 
natural resources -  especially water -  for sensitive eco- 
logical systems. Intractable conflict situations were 
apparently emerging and "water wars" were predicted 
(Starr 1991). However, there were some  misconceptions 
on how tensions and rivalry on water would be 
expressed. Wars over water resources are rare in the 
modern world.  International conflicts are usually 
negotiated and agreements are often reached. These 
agreements tend to focus on broad approaches and 
lack operational details for resource utilization. This 
solution is not necessarily more acceptable. Potential 
international conflicts are then transformed into re- 
gonal  and local socioeconomic  conflicts threatening the 
local resource base. Local communities shoulder the 
burden of social and ecological change. These commu- 
nities are often voiceless and have little capacity for 
adapting to the changing circumstances. The conse- 
quences are even more serious in societies with no tra- 
dition of  grassroots participation and few channels for 
the affected people to air their views and interests. Aid 
agencies and corporate entities supporting and partici- 
pating in the development process usually interact with 
relevant national agencies. They have few local con- 
tacts and little knowledge of social and on  the local is- 
sues. There is a need to identify which resources are 
important for the local communities, which ones are 
tradable or expandable and which ones are not, and 
how this should be controlled. While these are general 
considerations, every watershed has specific character- 
istics to be considered  in development planning (McCdy 
1996). 
The lower Mekong River basin (LMRB), a relatively 
ecologically intact area, is facing largescale changes  in the 
name of  development over the next decade. It is a sensi- 
tive entity in several aspects. The basin has a complex 
ecological  system and major changes could upset the bal- 
ance. The social system, historically one of the most con- 
flict ridden in the world, is also delicate and facing  changes. 
Primary production could be forced to give way to pro- 
duction in the modern sectors. As a resource base, the 
river basin is a cornerstone for all four LMRB countries. 
As a regional concern, it is one of  the single most impor- 
tant foreign policy questions. 
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) Agreement 
of 1995  addresses several problem areas in a general way, 
but its contradictions  may continue to disturb implemen- 
tation of development in the basin. The agreement pre- 
supposes that national authorities will develop its general 
statements into laws, policies and guidelines. The agree- 
ment has been a catalyst for a renewed interest in and in- 
creased pace of  modern development in the regon. The 
capacity of the MRC in safeguarding the resource base is 
limited. The authority vested in it by the different  partici- 
pating countries varies, and the position its executive agency 
the MRC Secretariat,  has vis-a-vis other agencies in the re- 
gion is unclear. The relation between various  states and the 
MRC are perhaps not unclear, but not as solid and direct as 
one could hope for. The MRC (and  its secretariat)  has no 
authority in duencing  the regional activities  in the man- 
agement of the shared resources as hs  is vested at the na- 
tionallevel. TheNationalMekong  Committees do  not have 
any sigruficant role in the management of  the resources within their national jurisdictions. There is thus a possibil- 
ity that the conflict resolution achieved at one level will 
result in conflicts and unsustainable resource utilization at 
a more local level of  authority. 
There are many plans for hydropower and largescale 
irrigation projects. There are several problems associated 
with them. A common feature for many of  these is that 
the scale and the design of  the projects are out of  tune 
with the level of  development in these countries, with the 
administrative  and technical capacity,  and with the national 
budgets. Grassroots interests are not taken into consid- 
eration  and there is no provision for public participation. 
A major change of  the resource base, on which the people 
in the basin are heavily dependent, without the adequate 
administrative capacity and without consulting the local 
people is a dangerous undertaking. The MRC Agreement 
that was meant, inter aha, to protect the ecosystem and 
the resource base could well threaten the ecosystem and, 
as a consequence, the livelihood of  people living there. 
While the scale of  this threat cannot be assessed in this 
paper, we address the two most urgent questions on the 
impact of  the development of  the Mekong River basin. 
These relate to ecological sustainability and its relation to 
survival, and the degree of  public participation in the de- 
velopment process. Put more precisely: 
I  What are the overarching threats to the regional 
resource base? 
I  What are the possibilities for increasing the role of  the 
local communities to share  responsibility for the utili- 
zation of  the water resources of  the lower Mekong 
basin? 
In this context, we will also try to assess policy changes 
that the MRC Agreement has triggered in the two "core 
countries" of  the LMRB and ask: 
I  What are the consequences of  the MRC Agreement for 
Lao PDR and Cambodia? 
The paper is based on a number of  interviews with 
decisionrnakers and 'experts'  in the region and on a 
number of  empirical  studies on community organization 
carried out in rural Cambodia. In addition, it draws on a 
large number of  secondary sources, ranging from national 
White Papers on the development  of  the Mekong basin 
to reports from a number of  development institutions in 
the region. Finally, it draws on the findings of  the au- 
thors' previous report for the Swedish aid agency, Sida 
(Ojendal  and Torell 1997). 
The paper discusses some theoretical perspectives on 
watershed (ecosystem)  management, the impacts of  hu- 
man intervention  and a brief background of  the Mekong 
issue. It then addresses the three questions and draws 
some tentative conclusions on the risks and possibilities 
of  the MRC Agreement at the national and local levels. 
Perspectives on Change 
in Sensitive Human Ecosystems 
Ecological systems are sensitive. They are constantly 
evolving and in a situation of  instability and change they 
adapt to new conditions in order to regain stability. Some 
changes are natural, for example, seasonal changes and 
individual  plant and biogeochemical changes,  while oth- 
ers are caused or accelerated by human interaction  with 
the ecosystem. The outcome of  anthropogenically  driven 
environmental  change is often a less valuable ecosystem 
in terms of  the quantity and quality of  the resources. The 
social and economic outcome of  environmental change is 
dependent on variables such as  population density, wealth, 
technology, the speed of  change, the management re- 
sponse, and the ability to import resources to replace losses 
aohnston  and Olsen 1998). 
Ecosystem management is often based on the premise 
that economic development inevitably competes with eco- 
system preservation (a win-lose situation). Resources are 
valued from the perspective of  how much income they 
can generate for those who utilize them. The noncommer- 
cial value of  the resources is seldom considered. In many 
areas of  the world, both developing and developed, man- 
agers often believe that they cannot afford to be conser- 
vationists. Management of  watersheds is often 
shortsighted, focusing  on individual interventions (e.g., 
hydropower, logging) and not taking their long-term eco- 
system impact into account. This leads to management 
cycles that are short and out of  synchronization with 
longer- term ecosystem cycles. Holling (1995) notes that 
"  .  .  . each proceeds at its own pace and in its own space, 
and this creates extraordinary conflicts when there are 
extreme mismatches among the scales at which ecosys- 
tems, institutions, and societies function". 
This quote needs to be considered seriously in the fu- 
ture development of  the LMRB, which is facing growing 
internal and external pressures for development. There is 
risk of  a mismatch between the ecosystem and its human 
management as solid institutions managing th~~  process are 
in short supply, the involvement of local people in the process 
is inadequate and outside actors routinely have too little 
knowledge about the societies and ecosystems in which they 
are intervening. 
Public participation,  as  part of  a functioning democratic 
decisionmaking  process, is one of  two pillars in adaptive  mn- 
agemen  t. Public participation ensures that learning will be 
maximized. Political conflict can provide ways to recognize 
errors, complementing and reinforcing the self-conscious 
learning of  adaptive  management (Lee 1993). The second 
pillar in adaptive management is reliable knowledge gained 
from experience. In order to attain reliable knowledge, 
baseline indicators  have to be established through quahta- 
tive studies carried out prior to any intervention. A  barrier 
to sustainable  management is that decisionmakers are of- 
ten reluctant to question policies and their relevance and, 
therefore, are not likely to transfer learning over time. Current Status 
The Mekong is one of the great rivers of  the world. 
From its orip  in the Tibetan Himalayas, the 4 200 km 
long river's watershed stretches over China, Myanmar, 
Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam. The geo- 
graphical features vary widely, from rugged mountains 
and upland plateaus to low flat deltaic areas. The river is 
the source of  capture  fisheries and water for agriculture 
and aquaculture. For example, the Mekong delta in Viet- 
nam generates close to 45% of  Vietnam's total food pro- 
duction in rice equivalent, though it covers only 12%  of 
the land area and holds 22.6%  of  the population (Qendal 
and Torell 1997). Eighty-five percent of  Cambodia lies 
within the LMRB, so the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap 
Lake are of  great importance to the population. The coun- 
tries of  the Mekong River basin (MRB) are rich in natural 
resources, although, there is a lack of  documented in- 
formation on them. The region is heavily dependent on 
the natural resource base and the area is relatively abun- 
dant inforest, water, fish and mineral resources. Most 
of  the population (about 84%)  is rural and as such de- 
pends on these resources for their livelihood (MRCS 
1996a). At the same time, the natural resources are im- 
portant for the nations as a means of  generating foreign 
currency through export, as a source of  raw materials 
and food, and for handicraft industries. The natural re- 
sources are being degraded in some areas, mainly be- 
cause of  the increasing population pressure combined 
with their exploitation  for economic development. 
The Mekong region has a high rate of  economic 
growth, though the countries are at different levels of 
development. Despite recent financial difficulties, Thai- 
land is close to achieving the status of  a Newly Indus- 
trial Country (NIC), while Cambodia, Lao PDR, and 
Vietnam are less developed as defined by per capita GDP 
(Table 1).  Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam are all in a 
phase of  transition from centrally planned economies to 
market-oriented economies. 
In spite of  international and institutional coopera- 
tion on the river basin since 1957, the Mekong River wa- 
tershed is basically untouched by modernization. There 
is only one mainstream dam in the upper section and 
none in the lower Mekong. The river is not extensively 
used for irrigation or for transport of  goods. However, 
the people living in the river basin use its resources ex- 
tensively for primary production. The Mekong Com- 
mittee was set up in 1957 with the mandate to coordinate 
the development around the Mekong River. Due to the 
many political conflicts in these countries, the Comrnit- 
tee could not pursue its mandate and the Mekong re- 
gion did not have any large-scale development plans. 
The Committee was reformed in 1995 as the Mekong 
River Commission to include all four of  the LMRB coun- 
tries. This was a new start for cooperation  in the devel- 
opment of  the region. 
The MRB Agreement provides an opportunity for 
Table  I. Some  economic  indicators for Thailand, 
bo PDR, Cambodiaand Vietnam. 
Thaitand  85  1950  51)  40900 
Lao PDR  8.2  280  a8  2 080 
Camboda  41)  W)  26 1  472 
Vm  8.8  240  (1994)  14.4  19600 
Sources: Stat'btical yearbook 1995  and k'a  hcik  Review 1996. 
cooperation among the four countries to pursue com- 
mon development projects.  All four countries have 
launched growth plans that will result in a sharply in- 
creasing demand for electricity and a greater require- 
ment of  water for agriculture and aquaculture. Rapid 
population growth and industrialization  place a strain 
on natural resources. The potential economic value of 
the natural resources of  the basin, whether for irriga- 
tion, hydropower, transportation or fishing, is gigantic. 
The costs and benefits, the risks and potentials are very 
high. Economic, political, social and environmental in- 
terests must be carefully balanced in realizing the po- 
tential. The pace of  change must be acceptable to the 
population. 
Threats to  the Resource Base 
The general environmental condition of  the MRB is 
quite good, especially in Lao PDR and Cambodia. How- 
ever, there are indications of  potential problems such as 
loss of  forests, soil erosion, changes in water quality, pos- 
sibly water quantity, and overfishing. Threats to eco- 
system health stem from both general and particular 
uses. Nonsustainable management of  resources, often 
triggered by population growth and exploitation  airn- 
ing at fast economic returns, leads to general overuse of 
resources. Apart from these general threats, the MRB 
faces a number of  specific threats, mainly in the form of 
plans for large-scale hydropower development and irri- 
gation schemes. These activities usually involve inter- 
national investments that are not familiar with local 
conditions. 
The total population in the MRB, including the sec- 
tions of  Myanmar and the Yunnan province that are situ- 
ated within the Mekong watershed, was estimated at 65.7 
million in 1995 (MRCS 1996a). The population growth is 
estimated to be around 2%  per annum. In Cambodia 
and Lao PDR, the pressure on land is not yet as severe 
as in the Mekong delta and northeasternThailand. How- 
ever, the two countries have high population growth 
rates (2.6%  per annum for Lao PDR and 2.8%  per an- 
num for Cambodia), so the situation is likely to change. 
In Lao PDR about 50%  of  the population is below 15  years 
of  age and is expected to double over the next 25 years Table 2. The  energy situation in the Mekong  River  basin. 
w  Ydropawer  pm  Eghatd  Elemthy  Emmated  %ofhouseholds 
potltlal  damd  powerdemand  derrand  elecaicii  wppliedwith 
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(Qendal and Torell 1997). This will sigruficantly increase 
the pressure on natural resources like land and water. 
Since the MRB is rich in natural resources such as 
water, forests, minerals and biodiversity, development 
strategies will be based on these resources. Unlike the 
development of  the industrialized world, where resource 
exploitation leading to ecosystem changes took place over 
a long period of  time, the environmental  changes in the 
MRB are likely to occur rapidly if not managed properly. 
It is unlikely that the Mekong region will have the oppor- 
tunity to substitute  lost resources with imported goods 
from less developed countries as the western world does. 
Hence, it is crucial to use an adaptive resource manage- 
ment strategy that is able to detect problems before the 
ecosystem is harmed beyond recovery. If  local commu- 
nities are involved in development projects it may be 
possible to find solutions before serious damage occurs. 
Large-scale development  projects are putting pres- 
sure on forest and water resources through logging and 
hydropower operations. Lao PDR, which has one of  the 
highest ratios of  forest cover to totalland area in Asia, has 
experienced a sigruficant  decline of  forest resources over 
the last two decades. It is estimated that only about 10% 
of  the remaining forests are commercially valuable 
(Ojendal and Torell 1997). Cambodia is also experiencing 
an alarming rate of  deforestation. In the early 1990s, ille- 
gal logging operations led the forests to be cut at a pace 
that is three to five times higher than the sustainable  rate 
(Ojendal  and Tore11 1997). The forest exploitation is an 
example of  resource exploitation driven by individual eco- 
nomic interests instead of  a more sustainable development 
plan supporting the long-term benefit of  the ecosystem 
and the population as a whole. 
There is a substantial hydropower capacity in the 
MRB, although less than 5%  is developed. Some dream 
of  Lao PDR becoming a future  Kuwait of  Indochina, with 
its many tributaries winding down the hills of  the 
Annamite Chain and the northern highlands and the larg- 
est potential for hydropower generation in the LMRB 
(Table 2). There are many interests, with Thailand in the 
fronthe,  that wish to see a large expansion of  hydropower 
in Lao PDR.  The economic benefits of  hydropower 
development have to be weighed against potential envi- 
ronmental destruction,  lost economic opportunities and 
international economic dependency.  Hydropower devel- 
opment inevitably leads to local changes in the environ- 
ment and competes with other economic sectors, such as 
fisheries, agriculture and tourism, for available resources. 
Although there are environmental  and social risks 
attached to hydropower, it is receiving serious attention 
in the region. There is strong  national and regional pres- 
sure for the production of  electricity, It is a sector, like 
mining, that attracts foreign direct investments. The full 
environmental  and social costs relating to the develop- 
ment of hydropower should be incorporated  in the project 
cost. If  the "polluter pays" principle is adopted, the users 
of electricity should pay the true value of  the resources 
used. Unfortunately, the users of  the resources usually 
have financial power and political support, while the local 
people, the environment, and future  generations are not 
organized and unable to exercise political influence.  In 
most projects only the direct costs are considered. In some 
cases, e.g., the Narn Theun-Hinboun  project in Lao PDR, 
an environmental protection agreement has been negoti- 
ated. In this case one million US dollars of  the project's 
budget were allocated for this purpose. This is a minor 
sum compared to the total cost of  US$28O million (qendal 
and Torell l997). If the true costs, including the depletion 
of  biodiversity, fish resources, loss of  social and cultural 
values, and decreased access to agricultural land, are im- 
posed on the projects, they may turn out to be relatively 
poor investments compared to alternative development 
possibilities. 
Another potential threat to both water quality and 
quantity in the lower Mekong and its tributaries are 
upstream activities. China has many plans for the use of 
the waters of  the Mekong and is currently constructing a 
series of dams on the main stream. A large-scale irriga- 
tion of  the Korat Plateau will also be environmentally 
destructive for downstream areas.  It will result in 
decreased water flow downstream and lower water qual- 
ity because of  pesticides and acidity, while higher salinity 
would result if saltwater intrusion increased in the delta. 
Thailand also has plans for transbasin diversions in the 
northern part of  the country. The two areas most likely 
to suffer from decreased water quality and quantity 
are the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia and the Mekong delta 
in Vietnam.  The Tonle Sap Lake, covering up to 10 000 square km during the peak wet season, provides 
one of  the most productive fisheries in the world. The 
lake is extremely rich in plant and animal biodiversity, At 
the same time its hydrological features, with seasonal 
changes in the water flow, act as a natural flood regulator 
downstream. In Cambodia, over 80%  of  the daily protein 
intake comes from fish,  of  which over 60%  are caught in 
the Tonle Sap (Ojendal and Torell 1997). Upstream activi- 
ties pose a serious threat to the lake and, in a worst-case 
scenario, the lake area may decrease or even disappear. 
In this scenario, the depletion of fish and forest resources 
will have serious implications on the livelihood and food 
security of  the people dependent on them and lead to se- 
vere repercussions throughout  the MRB. 
One reason underlying the regional focus on large- 
scale hydropower and irrigation projects is that there 
is an undervaluation of  "free" resources such as fish, 
fuelwood, frogs, snakes and other species caught as a 
secondary product to rice cultivation. Many of  these 
products never reach the market and their importance 
is often neglected when estimating benefits and costs 
of  large operations. Subsistence  farming, fishing and 
hunting supports the majority of  the population. The 
scale and design of  many development  projects are out 
of  tune with the level of  development and the capacity 
of  the region. If  development proceeds without tak- 
ing the value of  the existing activities into account, and 
if  strategies are not adapted to suit the local circum- 
stances, there is a risk that the development will lead 
to rapid ecosystem changes which will alter the avail- 
ability of, for example, fish, fuelwood and arable land. 
In this scenario, development will most likely benefit 
only a small proportion of  the population and leave 
the rest worse off. 
In summary, the MRB in general and Lao PDR and 
Cambodia in particular, are presently at a point where 
they have the possibility of  choosing the path they will 
take for their development and for the management 
of  their natural resources.  As of  now, most of  the 
threats to the ecosystem stem from general factors. But 
there are potential threats from development activities. 
There is a risk that major hydropower development 
and large-scale water diversions will have a devastat- 
ing effect on the MRB ecosystem. Therefore, it is es- 
sential to involve the various interest groups at the 
international,  regional and locallevels, and to thoroughly 
discuss and study the long term costs and benefits of  spe- 
cific projects. Alternative development paths should also 
be considered. 
Increasing the Role of Local Communities 
Large-scale ecological changes are of  concern in them- 
selves. If  they occur without preparation or consultation 
with local communities, they are a recipe for disaster. In 
the words of  Hill (1995): 
"Failure to include human values in planning 
and implementation of  development projects 
has resulted  in the continuing loss of 
biodiversity and increased social conflict." 
To  achieve genuine public participation in the devel- 
opment of  the Mekong region may be difficult for several 
reasons. The development agenda has overlooked pub- 
lic participation and in all four countries there is a wide 
gap between the modern and the traditional sectors. 
Modem projects tend not to take cognizance of  traditional 
production and local needs.  There is no tradition of 
grassroots participation in national policymalung.  There 
are no established systems for the local administration  to 
communicate with the local people and vice-versa. The 
workplan of  the MRC  is not a result of  a participatory pro- 
cess. International  or transnational cooperation  tends to 
distance decision-making from the grassroots. Finally lack 
of  appreciation  and knowledge of  the livelihood of  the 
local communities and the underestimation of  the value 
of  local production will seriously undermine the future 
existence of  the traditional sectors. 
Though participation is poor, there is an increasing 
awareness of  the need for involving the local communi- 
ties -  at least in the rhetorical organizational objectives as 
stated by the MRC's Chief Executive: 
"To plan for the sustainable and rational uti- 
lization,  protection, conservation and man- 
agement of  water resources  based on 
community needs and priorities within the 
framework of  national economic develop- 
ment policy 
To design, implement and evaluate projects 
and programs that are both economically 
efficient and socially appropriate within 
clearly defined strategies, based on an ap- 
proach of  full public participation, including 
that of  women, youth, indigenous people, 
local communities in water management 
policy-making  and decision-making." 
(Matoba 1995) 
One of  the largest donors to the MRC states in an 
internal document that: 
"Valuable local experience  and knowledge 
will be lost in the planning process by not in- 
volving local participation in the process of 
priority-setting  and decisionmaking with re- 
spect to the future development of  the 
Mekong River Basin. It may further lead to 
situations  of  dissatisfaction and social unrest, 
and may harnper/delay or in worst case even 
block the needed socioeconomic develop- 
ment of  the area." It continues: 
"Public participation in the planning and de 
cision making processes should be ensured 
so that people affected by planned develop- 
ments have the opportunity  to express their 
interests and see that they are takenseriously 
This process will help ensure understanding 
and acceptance  of  decisions, and a feeling of 
shared responsibility." 
The Policy and Planning Division of  the MRC 
Secretariat writes in a project proposal, as a part of  a di- 
rect attempt to address the public participation deficit, that: 
"Therefore it is strongly felt that preempting 
these conflict situations  should be one of  the 
prerequisites  for sustainable development 
and this can perhaps be accomplished by 
means of  public participation in the various 
and important stages of  planning and devel- 
opments." (MRCS 199613) 
Finally, an example can be quoted from the UNESCO 
project on the protection of  the Tode Sap: 
"Government agencies must delegate some 
degree of  local control to communities. De- 
cision making bodies that plan and imple- 
ment  policies  on natural  resources 
management must have sufficient represen- 
tation of  local people. .  .  A willingness to ne- 
gotiate settlements  with communities  must 
be displayed at an early stage." (UNESCO 
1996) 
However, these are ambitions and plans. Which re- 
ality do they address? 
In Cambodia, probably the most difficult country of 
the four in which to put these visions into practice, an in- 
teresting development is going on in terms of  strength- 
ening local participation. Traditionally there has been a 
very low level of  public participation in or political resis- 
tance to change. Cambodian culture  is hierarchical with 
few built-in mechanisms for people's participation, at least 
in terms of  people standing  up to authority in a construc- 
tive way. The experiences of  the last decades have rein- 
forced the top-down, centralist approach to development 
(Ovesen et al. 1996). Recently a number of  initiatives on 
involving local communities have been launched. These 
changes have been initiated by the development commu- 
nity, either through the work of  NGOs or through official 
development assistance projects such as the Cambodia 
Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration Project Phase 2 
(CARERE2). They have been accepted by the central Cam- 
bodian administration  and enthusiastically supported at 
and below the provincial level. The idea with CARERE2 
is that the local communities analyze their own situation 
and plan on how to improve it. Villagers as well as the 
local administration  are involved in the process. While 
this CARERE2 experiment is limited to five (out of  21) 
provinces, similar initiatives are being pursued in other 
parts of  the country and the idea of  Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) is slowly taking root. The Ministry 
of  Rural Development is now a staunch  supporter of  the 
idea and plans to make it nationwide. A limiting factor is 
the lack of  communication between various levels of  the 
administration, and the lack of  economic, knowledge, 
and technical resources and skills. Economic liberaliza- 
tion and administrative  reforms have reduced and im- 
poverished local administrations, which makes collective 
action much more difficult. Local leadership and man- 
agement has not been able to effectively organize  local 
communities due to a lack of  trust. 
In Lao PDR, the situation is less plagued by social 
inertia and lack of  self-organization. Local communities 
are probably quite capable of  managing their own re- 
source use. Major construction projects at the village 
level provide a clear example of  how the community 
organizes sustained cooperation for the benefit of  all. 
Schools, pagodas and irrigation dams are common ex- 
amples where the community mobilizes large amounts 
of  labor, material and sometimes money (Ireson 1996). 
There is no tradition of  local organizations opposing the 
State. In addition, the State has had very little presence 
in local villages in remote communities and has little 
knowledge about them. 
In both Cambodia and Lao PDR, therefore, it will 
require much more than launching a project on public 
participation or writing objectives in project documents 
to ensure genuine and effective consideration of  local 
issues. 
Actions and Reactions to the 
1995 MRC Agreement 
To what extent has the MRC Agreement affected the 
situation? 
Both Lao PDR and Cambodia have two overarching 
contradictions.  First, they are both highly dependent on 
the existing resource base of  the lower Mekong region 
and its sustainable use. On the other hand, they are de- 
pendent on utilizing it and changing it in order to ac- 
commodate population growth, national economic 
growth and development imperatives. Second, they do 
not have much political weight in international fora, but 
they need to be involved in the international coopera- 
tion on Mekong issues. Lao PDR is aware of  the need to 
balance the benefits of  development of  the river and the 
possible economic and political damage this could have 
on downstream  countries. For this, regional communi- 
cation and cooperation is of  the utmost importance. 
Consequently, Lao PDR  has welcomed the MRC Agreement and has been working seriously in order to 
fulfill its undertakings. The MRC Agreement dictates 
what Lao PDR can do, but not what it cannot do. 
Domestically, the Agreement has few implications 
for Lao PDR. Currently, there are no plans for any 
diversion of the Mekong River nor for any mainstream 
dams.  Several hydropower projects are, however, 
planned on the tributaries (Qendal and Torell 1997). 
These would have been planned even without the Agree- 
ment. They have been criticized for lack of  sustainability 
and lack of  public participation. However, this criticism 
has little to do with the Agreement. The Agreement 
states that "On tributaries of  the Mekong River, includ- 
ing Tonle Sap, intra-basin uses and inter-basin diversions 
shall be subject to notification to the  joint committee" 
(Agreement 1995, Art. 5), but gives no concrete limita- 
tion as to what can be done with domestic tributaries to 
the mainstream. The Agreement protects against "sub 
stantial damage" (Article  8) and tries to safeguard "...the 
environment, natural resources, aquatic life and condi- 
tions and ecological  balance of  the Mekong River Basin 
from pollution or other harmful effects resulting from 
any development plans and uses of  water and related 
resources in the basin." (Article 3). Neither of  these 
clauses protects against construction on tributaries. 
In the international context, the Agreement has 
given Lao PDR a clearer frame of  what it can do, with- 
out really impeding any of its existing plans. Domesti- 
cally, the importance of  the Agreement will depend on 
the type of  projects implemented in the future. 
Cambodia is a downstream country, receiving prob 
lems instead of  creating them. It is less concerned about 
the damage it causes and more about the damage caused 
by others. The Agreement serves as a means for Cam- 
bodia to protect itself against possible harmful effects of 
change in the Mekong water repe.  The protection of 
Tonle Sap has a special clause (Article  6) in the Agree- 
ment and the mechanism for prevention of  harmful ef- 
fects downstream is certainly better than the Cambodian 
government  could have accomplished bilaterally. Cam- 
bodia has consequently reacted very positively to the 
conclusion of  the Agreement and there is a widespread 
consensus in all formal bodies in Cambodia that the 
Agreement is good for their country. There is a grow- 
ing concern about the Basin Development Planning 
(BDP) process as Cambodia is negotiating from a posi- 
tion of  weakness -  downstream location and high depen- 
dency 
Within Cambodia the agreement  has become very 
prominent.  In the absence of  a Water Law or even a 
National Water Policy, the Agreement has become a 
major policy document. When the national policy docu- 
ment and laws are worked out, they will have to be 
adapted to the Agreement. A number of  consultancy 
reports commissioned by the MRC have also become 
major policy documents in themselves, rather than policy 
tools, dictating approaches and developments. 
To sum up, the MRC Agreement has given Cambo- 
dia a certain protection  from upstream activities and clari- 
fied its international position Domestically it has become a 
key instrument in establishing a national water policy At 
the local level it has so  far meant little. 
Conclusions 
Water wars are not &ely  in mainland Southeast  Asia. 
However, social and economic difficulties  at a locallevel  are 
likely to appear if the development  and  utilization of  the 
resources of  the MRB do not take them into consideration. 
The conclusions  of this paper are: 
In societies based heavily on primary production the 
mherent value of  the ecosystem must be recognized and 
development must be founded on  win-win solutions that 
balance the need for sustainable ecosystems and eco- 
nomic development. 
For development to be synchronized with ecosystem 
changes, development of  the MRB must focus on the 
ecosystem, must integrate the interests of  different user- 
groups and coordinate the regional andinternational  ac- 
tors and programs. 
Local ownership  of the development process is crucial 
for good results. Therefore, the development process 
should not be donor driven.  The MRB countries 
should, in their local and  regional development efforts, 
present solutions to issues such as ecological 
sustainability  and public participation to which the 
donors could then react. 
The MRC Agreement should not be seen as a fixed 
and final blueprint for future development but as a 
tool and a framework  for the planning and manage- 
ment of  future development. As such, it gives the 
countries a common platform from which they can 
proceed, adapting development to local as well as re- 
gional conditions and demands. 
It is important not only to focus the development pro- 
cess on national and regional issues, but to acknowl- 
edge local needs and interests. For management to 
be in synchronization at all levels, regional and na- 
tional development processes should be linked to lo- 
cal management initiatives. It is important to spur 
community-based management efforts. Local devel- 
opments will provide lessons of  sipficant  importance 
to the national and regional development process. 
To  achieve the above, it is necessary to establish com- 
municationbehveen  the four (or even better, six) states in 
the basin aiming to build mutual trust between the major 
stakeholders. In the current context of  economic devel- 
opment and of  resource exploitation in the basin, a high- 
level political commitment to obviate the risks between 
private and public exploitation, and regional and national 
authorities needs to be established. The MRC Agreement 
is  a necessary, but far from a sufficient, policy document. adjust to coming changes. 
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ABSTRACT 
l"hs paper investigates common resource tenure and management issues in the Mekong basin. Ten- 
ure is particularly fluid in this region due to rapid political and economic change and an accelerated 
infrastructure and resource development agenda. The paper looks at tenure questions with regard to 
resources managed in common at several levels -  regional, national and local -  within a number of 
resource sectors, including water, forests, fisheries, and land. 
At the regional level, issues of  common management between riparian States are discussed with 
reference to water and fisheries. At the national level, a  comparison is made between these countries with 
regard to co-management of forest resources. At the local level, the paper discusses management issues 
within Lao PDR, drawing on case studies of  local experience in tenure and management of fisheries and 
forests. 
Introduction 
This paper seeks to cross a number of  boundaries. 
To  begin with, the regional context raises issues of 
transboundary management of  aquatic and terrestrial 
resources. Furthermore, within a complex and highly 
interdependent  macroecosystem such as the Mekong ba- 
sin, boundaries between narrowly conceived resource 
sectors need to be broken down. There is also a scale 
boundary to be transcended,  as local, national, regional 
and global commons are significant in the Mekong ba- 
sin. To this end, the paper takes discussion  beyond local 
common property concerns. Scaling up from the local 
level brings innational issues of  property rights and natu- 
ral resource management in the context of  political and 
economic change in the transitional economies of 
Indochina. Regional cooperation also raises issues of 
resources held and managed in common by several 
countries. 
The paper attempts to address common property 
issues in a relational rather than a hierarchical way. 
Local common property issues are not looked at as just 
a subset of  common property questions in the national 
or regional context. The relationship  between the prob- 
lems of  sharing of  resources among countries, on the 
one hand, and among local users, on the other hand, is 
examined. The paper asserts the need to avoid prioritiz- 
ing the international dimension of  resource sharing 
above local issues, while also pointing out the limitations 
of overly localized approaches to managing common 
resources. 
Shared Resources in the Mekong Basin 
The Mekong basin covers 795 000 km2  in six coun- 
tries -  China, Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia 
and Vietnam. The basin's land, water, forest and fish 
resources are the basis of  the livelihood of  approxi- 
mately 65 million people. These resources are shared 
at several levels. 
Resources are shared due to the transnational 
character of  the basin.  Water used by an upstream 
country, for example, may be lost to a downstream 
country on a temporary, seasonal or permanent basis. 
For example, river levels in northern Lao PDR were 
unusually low for several months while the Manwan 
Dam in China was filling in 1995. Plans for large-scale 
water diversions such as the Khong-Chi-Mu1 
scheme in northeastern Thailand have significant im- 
plications for seasonal water availability in the Mekong 
delta in Vietnam.  Smaller diversions would take 
water out of  the basin altogether. Fig. 1  shows some 
of  the proposed intra and interbasin water transfers in 
the Mekong region.  Most of  these have a trans- 
boundary dimension. Even within the individual coun- 
tries, transboundary issues between provinces reflect 
the shared nature of  the resource. For example, lower 
delta provinces in Vietnam are concerned about 
irrigation developments in the upper delta that 
will affect freshwater availability, saline intrusion 
and acid sulphate leaching into lower delta water- 
ways. tage". This global value implies also a global interest and 
responsibility for the direct opportunity costs of  conser- 
vation. 
Political and  Economic 
Affecting Common 
Arrangements 
The Mekong region is undergoing a process of politi- 
cal and economic development with sigruficant  implica- 
tions for property rights, administrative  structures and 
governance of  local and national commons. Some of  these 
are discussed below. 
Resource development agenda 
Development of  mainland Southeast Asia is closely 
associated with a major agenda of  infrastructure and 
natural resource development in areas where physical 
isolation and geopolitical conflict have until recently pre- 
cluded large-scale projects. Numerous mining forestry 
and hydroelectric schemes in the Mekong basin have at- 
tracted interest from international investors and multilat- 
eral development banks. Large projects place sigruficant 
demands on the local resource base and they usually have 
implications -  notably downstream impacts -for  resource 
users further afield. This immediately raises the question 
of  whose resource is being developed,  by whom, under 
whose authority and control, and in consultation with 
whom. In areas where customary rights have taken pre- 
cedence in allocating  resources between and within local 
communities, and where competition and conflict over the 
resource base have previously not been an issue, the re- 
source development agenda can immediately raise ques- 
tions of  national versus local common property rights. 
Privatization  of resource 
and infrastructure  development 
Over the past decade, the transition economies of 
Indochina have carried out reform of economic mecha- 
nisms and property rights regimes. The move from a 
command economy to a market economy has been as- 
sociated with privatization at various levels. In the com- 
mon property area, the most obvious part of  the 
privatization agenda is the move from collective to 
household agricultural production through the 
decollectivization process. However, there are also sig- 
nificant implications on a broader scale. In the Mekong 
basin, there is a move towards privatization of  large- 
scale infrastructure projects that would earlier have been 
built with public financing. New schemes are now more 
typically financed under a variant of the build-own-op- 
erate-transfer (BOOT) model. This involves negotiated 
agreements  between major international  consortia and 
governments that effectively provide a lease on a natu- 
ral resource for an extended period, during which rev- 
enues are shared between the return on equity for the 
corporate  investor and royalty for the host government. 
Appropriation of  resources from local communities is at 
best compensated through a combination of cash and re- 
settlement arrangements. The mechanisms for taking into 
account local common property are still poorly developed 
in the context of  such programs. 
For example, the standard procedure for a hydroelec- 
tric project in Lao PDR is for an international  consortium 
of  investors to negotiate a memorandum of understand- 
ing (MOU) with the national government that gives the 
investor first call on leasing the river, land and forest area 
in question. If  the project is taken further, an environ- 
mental assessment then addresses  the on-site impact on 
the land and forest area to be flooded, the hydrological 
implications for downstream flows in the river being 
dammed and, in the case of a diversion, the receiving sys- 
tem, the impact on fisheries due to impoundment and bar- 
rier effects, etc. Rarely will such an assessment take into 
account the range of  customary and legal property rights 
repnes  governing access to and control over such re- 
sources as part of  an integrated social and environmental 
assessment process. There is systemic alienation of  local 
property rights due to corporate and state usurpation. 
Policy reform 
There is wide-ranging policy reform in the field of 
natural resource management. This is partly associated 
with a range of  forestry, fisheries, watershed and land ti- 
tling projects. More generally, the policy reform agenda 
is related to a restructuring of  local, provincial and national 
roles in decisionmaking  and resource allocation. 
In both Lao PDR and Vietnam, there are opposing 
trends in the centralization and decentralization of  author- 
ity over natural resources. For example, on the one hand, 
provincial autonomy in forest exploitation and manage- 
ment has been reduced with the rationalization of national 
forestry programs under central government control 
through a line-ministry approach. On the other, both 
countries have taken sigruficant steps in the partial devo- 
lution of forestland management to the local level through 
programs at the household level in Vietnam and at the 
village level in Lao PDR. This contrasts with Thailand, 
where the issue of  community rights over forestry land 
has been bogged down in a long-standing  community for- 
estry bill, whose genesis is closely associated with local 
challenges to state and corporate interests and commu- 
nity claims of  rights to manage. 
In each country, different departments  and ministries 
take different approaches. In Lao PDR, the Department 
of  Forestry has established a local forest management 
policy through a series of  regulations, decrees and laws 
that are handed down through provincial and districtgov- 
ernments. In principle, some of  these regulations allow 
for community input based on existing customary man- 
agement practice. In fact, the degree of participatory imple 
mentation has been quite erratic (Phanvilay, this vol.). The 
Department of  Livestock and Fisheries, on the other hand, currently takes a cautious and hands-off approach to regu- 
lation and management of  local fisheries. 
The environment of policy reform offers a number 
of  opportunities for developing co-management arrange- 
ments. Co-management of forests and fisheries  involves 
development of  a modus operandi for joint community and 
State management, but also involve regional issues. Just 
as there are limits to the effectiveness and equity of  State 
control over the local resource base, so there are limita- 
tions to community management of natural resources that 
are shared at a wider level. 
International  common property in the Mekong basin 
The most important international  common resource 
in the Mekong basin is water. While it is possible to calcu- 
late the contribution of  each riparian country to the total 
water availability in the basin, use of  water in one coun- 
try has direct implications for water available to down- 
stream countries. The 1995 Agreement for the Sustainable 
Development of  the Mekong River Basin that underlies 
the Mekong River Commission (MRC) is largely con- 
cerned with water sharing. The absence of  China and 
Myanmar from the MRC limits the efficacy of  the Agree- 
ment. Furthermore, the implications  of  upstream water 
development go well beyond downstream water avail- 
ability. The integrated nature of  a river basin ecosystem 
means that terrestrial resources are also affected. For 
example, upstream impoundments have implications for 
salinity intrusion  in the delta area, with potential impacts 
on land resources.  Similarly, terrestrial resource 
exploitation, such as clearance of about half the basin's 
forest cover over the past generation, has major -but 
poorly studied -  impacts on aquatic environments. 
While water is international  common property both 
through the physical characteristic of  the resource (it flows 
across borders) and through its international trade value 
(notably through cross-border hydropower sales), fish are 
international  common property primarily due to their 
biophysical (migratory)  characteristics. However, they 
remain a primary subsistence  resource, comprising an 
estimated 40 to 80%  of  the animal protein consumed by 
local people (Mekong Secretariat 1992). Fisheries are 
also the least understood natural resource in the Mekong 
basin. Though taxonomy is the best documented aspect 
of  Mekong fisheries, there are a large number of  species 
yet to be identified. Meanwhile, the migration, spawning 
and stock patterns of  individual species are only 
partially known and are the subject of  large assessment 
projects in the four lower riparian states. There is also 
very limited understanding  of  customary fishery manage 
ment practices and structures,  and of how these are chang- 
ing and adapting in the context of  new pressures and 
opportunities. 
National  common property in the Mekong basin 
In Lao PDR and Vietnam, state property is still often 
characterized as the "property of  the people". This sense 
of natural resources belonging to the people has a super- 
ficial democratic aspect, but it can also imply that custom- 
ary tenure involvi~  locally dhed  common property 
will not be acknowledged. The move from command to 
market economy structures involves a revamped system 
of  property rights, with associated tensions between the 
State and the local communities  as the "national common 
property" is either privatized or placed under the juris- 
diction of  State agencies. However, a considerable scope 
still exists for delimiting and distinguishing  between State 
and community ownership and management rights and 
responsibilities. Such delimitation is particularly sigrufi- 
cant in forestry and fisheries. This marks a sigruficant dif- 
ference between these countries and Thailand, as the latter 
has legislated a much more rigid distinctionbetweenstate 
and private tenure. Some of  the rigidness are, however, 
starting  to erode as Thailand moves to implement the 1997 
Constitution that provides sigruficant involvement  and 
participation  by local people in the planning and manage 
ment of  natural resources (Thailand 1997; Torell, this  vol.). 
The local Mekong  commons 
Local commons continue to play a sigruficant role in 
the lives of  the farming and fishing communities in the 
Mekong basin. Timber for house construction,  non-tim- 
ber forest products, stream watersheds and forests are 
subject to well-documented customary rules, regulations, 
prohibitions and sanctions in northern Thailand, the cen- 
tral highlands of  Vietnam, southern  Yunnan province and 
much of  rural Lao PDR. Muang  faai (weir and distribution 
channel)  irrigation schemes also involve local management 
of  a resource held in common by a defined set of  users. 
Grazing land is also usually held in common though rarely 
recognized by formal titling schemes. 
Fisheries management is less well documented so that 
policy is sometimes predicated on the notion of  fish as an 
open access resource. Nevertheless, closed or wetland fish- 
eries in the Mekong basin have established rules for com- 
munity management. Management of  more open 
waterways also recognizes the local common property 
nature of  this resource through prohibitions on the use of 
certain types of  destructive fishing equipment such as ex- 
plosives, poisons and fine-meshed nets. More complex 
and controversial is the establishment  of  local conserva- 
tion zones in the Mekong mainstream to protect a resource 
that is largely supra-local in its nature. In some cases, these 
zones have been established in the name of  community 
management by decree from above. 
Local commons in the countries of  the Mekong basin 
remained relatively uncontroversial, despite their ambigu- 
ous tenure status under the law, until other claims were 
placed on the resource. The rapid pace of  infrastructure 
and resource development is now making numerous such 
claims. In the case of  private property, appropriation  of 
the local resource base in the name of wider development 
is usually dealt with by compensation in cash or kind. In 
the case of  common property, however, compensation and Smaller streams are subiect to seasonal tenure rules. 
kgthe  wet season, fish are caught by local villagers 
along the length of  the stream course, using a variety 
of  ton traps. As the streams dry out (beginning in Feb- 
ruary or March), barrier traps are set up to hold fish 
back in deeper pools that become isolated from one 
another. Each pool is held in common by several house- 
holds belonging to a descent group (takun),  and spe- 
cific rules govern when fish are caught, how they are 
to be divided, and who can be invited to fish in the pool. 
By  April, only eels survive deep in the mud and these 
are also the common property of  the descent group. 
Floodplain swamps are associated with a range of 
tenure rules based on community arrangements. In 
two of  the villages with backswamps seasonally linked 
to the Sedone River, these arrangements focus around 
the annual tradition of phaa paa (dividing  the fish) -  a 
collective fishing-out of  the catfish, snakehead and 
smaller fish. The fish that are caught have spawned 
from mature fish that enter the swamp early during the 
wet season as water spills over from the Sedone River. 
Rules vary from one swamp to another. In Khamyaad 
village, the Bungkhaa backswamp is open to fishers from 
surrounding  villages on the day of  the phaa paa. How- 
ever, smaller pools dug out around the edge of  the 
swamp are household property. Both the open nature 
of  the phaa paa here, and the seemingly private aspect of 
individual enclosures, are based on rules set by a clearly 
defined village level management system and are asso- 
ciated with propitiation of  resident spirits.  There are simi- 
larities between this system and that governing a 
backswamp at Solonoi  further downstream. However, 
the fishing out of this swamp is strictly limited to resi- 
dents of  the one village, with no individual enclosures 
permitted.  Recent changes in the Khamyaad and 
Solonoi management systems have resulted from the 
release of  fingerlings. More specific access rules have 
been established, and a certain portion of  the extra catch 
has been set aside to supplement community funds. 
The Sedone tributary is not subject to exclusion- 
ary practices as are the smaller fishery environments. 
However, prohibitions on destructive practices, such 
as the use of  seine nets, fine mesh nets, poisons or ex- 
plosives, are governed by community sanction.At 
present, there are no comprehensive mechanisms for 
state enforcement of  sanctions or regulations. The 
Sedone tributary in Sanasomboun contains Lao PDR's 
earliest hydropower project, the Selabam Dam. While 
this 3 MW scheme is very small (compared with the 
many larger schemes slated for most of  the country's 
major tributaries), has a limited headpond and has a 
parallel natural stepped fall that allows for some fish 
migration, there are indications that fish composition 
above and below the dam is quite different. This is likely 
to be much more significant with the larger power 
schemes. Moreover, these larger schemes also involve 
new reservoir fisheries, though with poorly defined 
tenure. 
The Mekong fisheries in Sanasomboun and 
elsewhere are not subject to local common property 
rules as the fish are highly migratory. In 1993, villages 
along the Mekong were instructed by  some local 
authorities to set up fishing conservation zones. In 
the island village of  Don Kho, for example, a 50 m strip 
on the eastern side of  the island was declared a nomi- 
nal no-fishing area. A deep pool conservation zone 
south of  the island at Vern Khong was established 
as part of  a project to establish wang paa (fish palaces) 
elsewhere in southern Lao PDR. This project is admin- 
istered by the Department of  Forestry through its Wild- 
life and Fisheries Division. The Department of  Livestock 
and Fisheries (DLF) is less enthusiastic about such 
zones, seeing them as based on little scientific evidence 
of  their conservation values. The notion put forward 
by DLF can also be a sign of  different viewpoints on 
institutional roles. Some local people describe the ban 
on fishing  at Vern Khong as "cutting off  their hands 
and feet" as it covers important fishing grounds and 
have ceased to respect the ban. There is a strong aware- 
ness of  the international nature of  the resource and 
local fishers on the Mekong in southern Lao PDR see 
little point in refraining from using a resource that is 
being utilized across the border in Cambodia. Else- 
where in southern Lao PDR, there is more support for 
no-fishing zones. The international dimension is also 
apparent in the increase in extraction of  key species for 
sale across the border to Thailand. 
Different fisheries within a single localized area 
of  the Mekong thus involve sharing and joint manage- 
ment arrangements at a number of  levels. Similarly, 
these fisheries are subject to pressure involving 
both endogenous and exogenous influences. Overfishing 
is due both to endogenous factors such as population 
growth and adoption of new technologies, notably @nets. 
Exogenous influences such as domestic and international 
markets also play a role. Environmental impacts on the 
fishery range from localized problems associated with pes- 
ticide use to large-scale modifications due to hydropower 
and other development elsewhere.  Dealing with these in- 
fluences requires attention to the level at which they are 
manifest. 
Conclusion 
When we speak of  common resources, it is often as- 
sumed that it is mainly at the local level. This 
paper has raised issues of  common property at other lev- 
els. The international resource sharing  inherent in the de- 
velopment of  hydropower and other infrastructure 
development requires  institutional means  for 
international management of  the basin and it requires at- 
tention to the common property arrangements 
that already exist at other levels. The ambiguity and indeterminate nature of  re- 
source tenure with respect to many resources that form 
the basis for subsistence of  the people in the Mekong ba- 
sin is exacerbated by the rapid pace of  political and eco- 
nomic change.  Without close attention to common 
property arrangements at all levels, the competition and 
conflict among the many stakeholders  in the region's land, 
forest, fish and water resources can only be expected to 
intensify, 
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ABSTRACT 
The Mekong River basin is rich in aquatic resources that are critical to the livelihoods of  the poor 
inhabitants of  the region. Unfortunately these resources are grossly undervalued and the existinglegal and 
institutional structures are not adequate to protect and manage them in a sustainable manner. The legal 
structures are fragmented and the institutional responsibilities are often conflicting. There are no mecha- 
nisms for existing traditional systems and customary laws tobe incorporated into the legaland institutional 
structures that are being developed. The problem is exacerbated by  the fad that these structures are being 
developed with the assistance of  external aid agencies and experts whoare not aware of  traditional systems 
and practices in these countries and tend to superimpose their own systems in an environment with totally 
different requirements. The fad that the real 
nized or documented means that the assessment of  the costs and benefits of  development projects may be 
flawed. 
Introduction 
Throughout the Mekong River basin, fish and other 
aquatic products (such as frogs, eels, snails, crabs, etc.) 
found in "commons" like wetlands and floodplains are 
central to the livelihoods of the rural poor with limited 
ownership of  productive land. These areas are being 
threatened by encroachment,  overexploitation, destruc- 
tive practices, pollution and environmental  degradation, 
both man-made and natural. Governments, NGOs, sci- 
entists and others recognize the need to stop the degra- 
dation of  the catchments, wetlands and other 
waterbodies and their resources and to ensure that these 
are utilized in an equitable and sustainable manner. 
However, policy responses have been generally weak 
and uncoordinated. National government  jurisdiction 
and authority over natural resources tends to be frag- 
mented and governments lack the capacity to monitor 
resource use or to enforce regulations. 
A major problem that hinders sustainable use of 
natural resources is the lack of  ability, willingness, and/ 
or functioning systems to address the many different 
factors that need to be considered in designing viable 
options  for resources management. In the Mekong River 
basin, there are no clear legal, policy or institutional 
frameworks for safeguarding  the natural resource base 
and protecting the interests of  the poorer communities 
in terms of  access rights and equity. The valuation or 
assessment of  "common property resources" is very 
important for policy planning. In spite of  their impor- 
tance in the local (and national) economy these resources 
are usually undervalued, which makes them very vul- 
nerable to encroachment and degradation by those not 
dependent on them. 
In this paper "wetlands" refer to the whole range 
of  wet areas, seasonal or permanent, listed in Annex 1 
and include near-coastal areas, lakes and rivers, ricefields 
and man-made ponds, i.e., all wet areas of  the region. 
"Wild wetlands resources" refer to all noncultured 
animals and plants that are used for human consump- 
tion or production such as fish, snails, frogs, eels, snakes, 
crabs, etc. In this context, the value of  these resources in 
terms of  their tourism potential should also be consid- 
ered among their uses. 
* ICIARM  Contribution No.  1 563 Background 
As  a background, a description of  geographical, 
political, ecological, cultural,  and socioeconomic  factors is 
important for planning of natural resources management 
systems. Extensive overviews can be found in Hirsch 
and Cheong (19%),  MRC/UNEP-EAP (May 1997 and  June 
1997), and Qendal and   or ell (1997), so these are not con- 
sidered in this paper. 
Lack of information  and understanding 
A review of  existing literature on the geographical, 
economic, and sociological  aspects of  the region indicates 
that there is a lack of  information on key natural 
resources (such as fish) and their value to the local popu- 
lation. There is also a lack of  understanding of  the local, 
national and regional importance  of these resources. The 
legal structures and administrative responsibilities for 
planning and management of  natural resources are not 
well defmed. The roles and responsibilities of central and 
local authorities as well as the rights and responsibilities 
of  local communities and other users, are not very clear. 
In principle the "Agreement on the Cooperation  for 
the Sustainable Development of  the Mekong River" 
is intended to be a region-wide wetlands program cov- 
ering all the water areas (seasonal  as well as nonseasonal) 
of  the basin (MRC 1997).  However, there is a tendency 
to view all wetlands projects as "environmental" projects 
rather than for the integrative, productive use of  the 
natural resources by several sectors. This can, in turn, 
lead to additional complications in approach. 
Valuation of resources 
Wetlands are central and basic to the whole region, 
its development, its people and the cultures that have 
emerged in the region. As  expressed by  King 
Ramkamhaeng around the year 1300 (during the 
Sukhothai period of  present Thailand):"  there are fishes 
in the water and in the rice fields". It is worth remember- 
ing that the fields referred to are wetlands, which 
have a lot of  aquatic products besides rice and fish. 
The expression is also an indication of  the importance 
and expected availability of  fish as a central source of 
food. 
Wetland resources have not been very well re- 
corded in official statistics probably due to the abun- 
dance and relatively free access to freshwater aquatic 
products. Household surveys are being conducted to 
make an assessment of  the amount and value of  the 
consumption of  these products. Such surveys are be- 
ing done within the framework of  Mekong River 
Commission's (MRC) Fisheries Programme and Asian 
Institute of  Technology's Aqua Outreach Programme 
(see Gregory et al. 1997 and Ahmed et al. 1998, for ex- 
amples).  There has been no real assessment of  the value 
and the potential for development of  tourism in the 
region. Nor has any attempt been made to estimate 
the loss resulting from deterioration of  the environ- 
ment resulting from other development projects 
(qendal  and Torell 1997). 
The undervaluation of  natural resources and the 
external costs of  development projects has major implica- 
tions for planning and policy as these do not 
reflect the true economic benefits and costs of  various 
options.  This tends to favor urban-based needs and/or 
options related to intensive agriculture  schemes. While 
this is not an argument against urban development 
schemes per se, it is an indication of  the need to assess 
all options and opportunities based on adequate informa- 
tion on all tradeoffs. 
Environmental  impact assessments 
The countries of  the region are in different stages of 
the development  of laws and schemes with regard to en- 
vironmental impact assessment (EIA). The real value of 
wild wetlands products should be used for EIAs. If  not, 
these resources will be more vulnerable to encroachment 
by competing  users and the economic (and  subsistence) 
value of  these resources to the rural poor could be reduced 
and their means of livelihood lost. 
Legal and Institutional Development 
The history of  legal and institutional  development is 
quite different in the four member countries of  MRC. Only 
Thailand has had a long unbroken history of  development 
of  legal and institutional  structures from the Sukhothai 
period (1238-1378) up to the 1997 constitution. The devel- 
opment in the other countries has been more fragmented. 
In Cambodia, this is exemplified by: 
1  up to 1870s -  precolonial  systems based on traditional 
Khmer laws and institutions prevailed; 
I  1870s to 1954 - French systems were progressively 
superimposed; 
1954 to 1975 -  a dual system of  French and traditional 
laws was maintained; 
1  1975 to 1979 - the Khmer Rouge scrapped all laws 
and legal institutions; 
1979 to 1991 - the State of  Cambodia established a 
system of  revolutionary people's courts; 
1  1992 to 1993 -  the United NationsTransitionalAuthor- 
ity in Cambodia (UNTAC) period; and 
1  1993 to present -  21 September 1993, the constitution 
of  the Kingdom of  Cambodia was promulgated 
(Cambodian  Working Group Team 1998). 
This provides a background to the struggle to develop 
and establish functional legal and institutional  systems 
and to understand the traditional systems that affect 
peoples' willingness to follow rules and regulations. 
Cambodia is very much in the middle of  this struggle. 
Lao PDR and Vietnam have also had radical shifts 
in legal and institutional development. no well-developed systems  for local management of com- 
mons and wild wetland resomes (Chircop and Torell 1997; 
Jerndal1997;  The Nation l997). Access rights and owner- 
ship  systems are not clearly defined.  In Vietnam, it is still 
not possible to own land privately or collectively (Chircop 
and Torell 1997). User rights are based on long-term leases. 
There are no guarantees for continuous  or long-term user 
rights for wild wetlands resources and there is a risk of 
encroachment  by outside development  projects 
In the absence of  formal systems for allocation of 
rights to exploit and manage the wild wetland resources, 
existing practices like sharing  of  user rights and manage- 
ment are  based on customary laws and practices that are 
unwritten. Therefore, the successful  implementation of 
locally based management schemes and the sustained and 
improved well-being of  local communities will depend on 
the extent to which traditional practices and customary 
laws and rights are integrated into the mainstream legal, 
institutional  and policy structures. 
Constitutional basis for local management 
and customary law 
Cambodia 
In principle, the necessary elements are present in the 
constitution of  Cambodia. The constitutionstates  that "All 
persons, individually or collectively, shall have the right 
to ownership" (Cambodia 1993, Article 44). The Article 
goes on to speclfy that only Khmer entities and citizens 
shall have the right to own land. "Commons" (in a broad 
definition) are considered as "state property" and their 
use and management are to be determined by law (Cam- 
bodia 1993, Article 58). There is no direct reference to cus- 
tomary practices. 
Lao PDR 
The Lao constitution provides, in principle, a sufficient 
base for local management and customary law. For in- 
stance, Article 8 states that "All ethnic groups have the 
right to protect, preserve and promote the fine customs 
and cultures of their own tribes and of  the nation" and 
Article 14  states that "collective and individual ownership" 
is recognized (Lao PDR 1994). There are, however, a num- 
ber of  provisions that could imply reduced rights for local 
communities. For example, the use of  customary law such 
as "the rights (of the people) are exercised and ensured 
by the Lao People's Democratic Party" (Lao PDR 1994, 
Article 3) and Chapter VII could form the basis for the 
implementation of  top-down management and lines of 
command. Constitutional  support of  local management 
and customary laws are dependent on laws and regula- 
tions that are actually established. 
Thailand 
The launching  of  the Eighth National Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1997-2001) and the promulga- 
some radical changes in the fundamental  basis for decen- 
tralized and local management. The Eighth Plan (NESDB 
19%) has  focused whole sections on "popular g~vernance'~ 
(Part VII) and "popular participation in natural resources 
management" (Part VI, Chapter 3).  References are also 
made to the "incorporation of  local wisdom". 
The constitution  also contains  several provisions on 
the right of people and community, such as in Chapter III, 
Section 46: "... traditional  community shall have the right 
to conserve and restore their custom. Local intellect, arts 
or good culture of  their community and the nation and 
participate in the management, maintenance, preserva- 
tion and exploitation of natural resources and the envi- 
ronment in a balanced fashion and persistently as provided 
by law" (Thailand 1997). Furthermore, Section48  states 
that "property right is protected while another new ele- 
ment is Chapter IX contains provisions related to "local 
govemment" including a "duty to conserve local arts, cus- 
tom, intellect or good culturei1  (Thailand 1997, Section 289). 
Vietnam 
It is possible to find constitutional support for local 
management and customary laws but, as in the case of 
Lao PDR, these are dependent on suitable laws and regu- 
lations. Examples of provisions that support  the develop- 
ment of  customary practices are Article5 which states the 
right to "promote fine customs, habits, traditions  and cul- 
ture", and Article121  which stipulates that "the deputy of 
the People's Council represents the will  and aspirations of 
the local people" and he is also supposed to "answer their 
requests and proposals" (Vietnam 1992). 
Of  the four, the Thai constitution has the most clear 
and far-reaching commitment  to locally-based manage- 
ment and support for traditional  systems. 
External distortion and institutional development 
The constitutional  basis for local management and 
acceptance of  customary laws depends on specific laws, 
regulations and institutions. 
Thailand has had the opportunity to develop its legal 
system and institutional structure over a long period of 
time. In comparison, the other three countries are strug- 
glmg to get a workable legal system in place. The devel- 
opment of  the legal system is often based on outside 
support -  both financial and technical. This has led to the 
establishment of  an  ad hoc legal and institutional  structure. 
A lack of  coordination of  internal  support has led to the 
development of  different sectors along different "cultures" 
based on the systems of  the donor country. Alow rate of 
adoption at the grassroots  level is to be expected as the 
"law establishment process" is usually given too little time 
and a ready made "law" is presented to the country for 
adoption (at the national government level).  The proposed 
laws might be well constructed but may not be based on 
national or local needs. This will result in the development 
of  institutions that are not in tune with national traditions. Such patchwork laws usually result in conflicting  provi- 
sions with regard to different sectors or levels of  author- 
ity, 
A related problem is that development agencies  have 
considered problems based on whether law is rooted in a 
US type tradition and or a French (mainland Europe) 
tradition. Following advice given by US and European 
experts on  various programs for development, we sug- 
gest it is preferable to search for a local traditional base on 
which to build a legal and institutional  framework. 
Frequently the implementation of projects and pro- 
grams is in the hands of  the wrong  institutions. Most wet- 
lands are either lakes, rivers, ponds, floodplains, etc. 
(fishing areas) or ricefields (agriculture  and fishing areas). 
However, most wetlands management programs are op- 
erated by ministries or departments  of  the environment. 
In Cambodia, for example, the law states clearly that all 
wet or flooded areas are fishing areas and fall under the 
authority of  the Department of  Fisheries. However, the 
present wetlands programs such as the MRC Inventory 
and Management of  Cambodian  Wetlands are under the 
Ministry of Environment (however,  coordination  with 
other departments such as the Department of  Fisheries is 
anticipated in the project document). The donors' igno- 
rance of  existinglegal  systems adds to the confusion  in 
the roles and responsibilities  of national and local institu- 
tions and communities. 
Regional Agreements 
and  International Commitments 
The four countries of  the Mekong River basin have 
signed a number of regional agreements  and international 
conventions.  The central one on the Mekong River is 
the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of  the Mekong River Basin  signed by 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam on 5  April 
1995. The Agreement allows for the entry of  China and 
Myanmar into the MRC. Presently they are invited as 
observers to the meeting of  the Council and the Joint- 
Committees. Other important regional and interna- 
tional commitments are to the Greater Mekong 
Sub-region Initiative, membership in the Association 
of  Southeast Asian Nations, the Biodiversity Conven- 
tion, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of  Interna- 
tional Importance  especially as Water-fowl Habitats, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural  Or- 
ganization Convention on Cultural and Natural Heri- 
tage, and the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of  Wild Fauna and Flora. All of 
these contain provisions and objectives for sustainable 
use of  resources with special attention to the poorer 
groups of  society, indigenous people and other 
marginalized social units. It remains to be seen how 
these will translate into plans for local development. 
Conclusions 
Countries in the Mekong region should be encour- 
aged to strive for more coherent legal and institutional 
structures  based on local and national customs and tradi- 
tions for resource management, ownership, user rights, 
local decisionmaking, etc. 
For effective planning and management of  wetlands 
it is necessary to put them back under the central  line min- 
istries and seek coordination  and integration  between sec- 
tors, central and local authorities, and user and user 
groups. 
There is an urgent need to ensure that the implica- 
tions of  the gross undervaluation of  natural resources be 
made clear to development planners so that the real value 
of  these resources can be reflected in EIAs and develop- 
ment schemes in the Mekong region. 
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Saltwater 
A. Marinelcoastal  I.  Subtidal 
2 lntertidal 
3. Nontidal 
B.  Estuarine  I.  Subtidal 
2 lntertidal 
Nonvegetated 
Natural  subtidal bare marine 
Subtidal mariculture 
Vegetatedlcoral 
Subtidal marine coral 
Subtidal marine seagrass 
Subtidal marine seaweed 
Natural subtidal marine seaweed 
Subtidal marine seaweed farm 
Nonvegetated 
Natural 
lntertidal coastal beach 
lntertidal coastal mudflat 
lntertidal coastal cliff 
lntertidal coastal salt flat 
Artificial 
lntertidal coastal salt works 
lntertidal coastal aquaculture 
Vegetatedlcoral 
lntertidal marine coral 
lntertidal marine seaweed 
Natural  intertidal seaweed 
lntertidal marine seaweed farm 
Treeslshrubs 
Coastal mangrove swamps 
Coastal mangroye plantation 




Natural subtidal bar estuarine 
Subtidal estuarine aquaculture 
Vegetatedlcoral 
Subtidal estuarine coral 
Subtidal estuarine seagrass 
Subtidal estuarine seaweed 
Natural  subtidal estuarine seaweed 
Subtidal estuarine seaweed farm 
Nonvegetated 
Natural 
lntertidal estuarine beach 
lntertidal estuarine cliff 
lntertidal estuarine salt flat 
Artificial 
lntertidal estuarine salt works 
lntertidal estuarine aquaculture 
Vegetatedlcoral 
lntertidal estuarine coral Annex I,  continued 
Classification  Types  Subtypes 
lntertidal estuarine seagrass 
Intertidal estuarine seaweed 
Natural intertidal estuarine seaweed 
Intertidal estuarine seaweed farm 
Treeslshrubs 
Estuarine mangrove swamp 
Estuarine  mangrove plantation 
Forbslestuarine  salt marsh 
3.  Nontidal  Nonvegetated 
Nontidal estuarine aquaculture 
C. Coastal lagoon 
D. Inland salt lake 
Freshwater 
A. Riverine  I. River  Perennial river 
Pool in perennial river 
Channel in perennial river 
Natural channel in perennial river 
Perennial canal 
With perennial rapid 
With perennial waterfall 
Seasonal river 
Pool in seasonal river 
Channel in seasonal river 
Natural channel in seasonal river 
Seasonal canal 
With seasonal rapid 
With seasonal waterfall 
2  Riverine banks1 
beacheslbars 
3.  Riverine  Floodplain grassland 
floodplain  Natural floodplain grassland 
Human-made floodplain grassland 
Floodplain wet rice 
Other floodplain crops 
Floodplain treeslshrubs 
Natural seasonally flooded treeslshrubs 
Human-made seasonally flooded crops1 
orchards 
Seasonal floodplain lake 
Seasonal floodplain pond 
Seasonal back swamplmarsh 
Natural seasonal back swamplmarsh 
Human-made seasonal back swamp1 
marsh 
Wet rice in seasonal back swamplmarsh 
B. Lacustrine  I.  Lake > 8 ha  Permanent lake 
Natural permanent  freshwater lake 
Human-made permanent reservoir 
Seasonal lake 
Natural seasonal freshwater lake 
Human-made freshwater lake 
2.  Pond < 8 ha  Permanent pond 
Natural permanent freshwater pond 
Human-made  freshwater pond 
Freshwater aquaculture pond Annex I,  continued 
Classification  TYP~  Subtypes 
Sewage treatment pond 
Farm pond 
Cooling pond 
Borrow pit, excavated pond 
Others 
Seasonal pond 
Natural seasonal freshwater pond 
Human-made seasonal pond 
C.  Palustrine  I. Permanent palustrine 
2  Permanently flooded grassland 
3.  Permanent freshwater marsh, with treeslshrubs 
4.  Seasonal palustrine 
5.  Seasonally flooded grassland 
6.  Natural seasonally flooded grassland 
7.  Human-made seasonally flooded grassland 
8.  Human-made seasonally flooded plantation 
9.  Seasonally freshwater marsh, with sedges 
10.  Seasonally freshwater swamp, with seasonally 
freshwater swamp, with treeslshrubs 
I I. Natural seasonally flooded swamp 
12.  Human-made seasonally flooded plantation 
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ABSTRACT 
The Cambodian proverb "where there is water, there is fish" is still true for the fisheries of  Cambodia 
and of  the entire lower Mekong basin, both in terms of food security and as a major industry providing 
employment and income for millions. However, potential threats are posed by  the increasing fislung effort, 
environmental degradation and infrastructure development. This paper examines the main fisheries sedors 
and their contribution to the national economy. It also examines the state of  exploitation of  fish stocks, the 
reasons for their deche and how further deterioration can be stopped. Safeguarding the present situation 
requires: (i) greater awareness at the decisionmaking level, in government and international organizations, 
of  the sigruficance  of  fish for food security and employment; (ii) a  functional platform for dialogue and coop 
eration between the ripariancountries in order to be  able to deal with the upcoming water and fisheries 
management issues in a timely way; (iii) an improved and enlarged capacity for research and management; 
and (iv) a strengthened role of the fishing lo& 
management bodies and increasing environmental awareness of  the stakeholders. 
Introduction 
Cambodian freshwater capture fisheries probably 
contribute more to national food security and the 
economy than such fisheries do in any other country 
in the world. The Khmer saying me-an tuk, me-an trey 
meaning, "where there is water, there is fish" reflects 
this situation. Despite this, the government and inter- 
national organizations have shown a remarkable lack 
of  interest in the state of  capture fisheries that are 
threatened by the impacts of  the ongoing development 
of  the Mekong River watershed, as well as internal  mis- 
management. This may have been due to misleading 
records and the complexity of  the issues at stake. 
The paper attempts to address this information 
shortage by providing an overview of  the problems 
facing Cambodian  freshwater capture fisheries. First it 
briefly describes the main fishery sectors and their con- 
tribution to the national economy in terms of food se- 
curity and employment. Then it examines the state of 
exploitation of  some of  the fish stocks and the perceived 
causes of  their decline stemming from external (up- 
stream) and internal (national) sources. Finally, ways 
are identified to contain further deterioration. 
Although the lower Mekong River basin is still rela- 
tively untouched in Cambodia and the Lao PDR, re- 
gional development is accelerating  causing pollution, 
erosion through deforestation, and increased water 
usage for urban and industrial water needs, irrigation 
schemes and hydropower generation.  The cumulative 
effects of  these demands on the fish resources of the 
Mekong are not easily quantifiable but are likely to be 
serious. 
In Cambodia and Lao PDR, these processes are still 
in their early stages, whereas development projects in 
Vietnam and Thailand are much more advanced.  Cam- 
bodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam signed a treaty 
in April 1995 for the purpose of  reaching a water utili- 
zation agreement through cooperation in the Mekong 
River Commission.  China and Myanmar also share the 
Mekong waters but have so far declined to join. The 
contribution of  each country to the average river flow 
(MRC 1998) is as follows:  China 16%,  Myanmar 2%,  Lao 
PDR  35%,  Thailand 17%,  Cambodia 19%  and Vietnam 
11%. 
In Cambodia, the improved political situation, 
returning refugees and a reduction in military person- 
nel are swelling the number of  fishers and increasing sustaining the present level of  fish production are 
being converted to ricefields. The pressure on the fish 
resources in the open access sector of  fisheries is grow- 
ing and conflicts with the privatized (limited access) 
sector are intenslfymg. These are the main management 
challenges facing the Department of  Fisheries in Cam- 
bodia. In order to gain sufficient government and in- 
ternational donor support it is critical to highlight and 
publicize the large contribution that fisheries make to 
national food security and the economy. 
Fisheries in Cambodia 
and the Lower Mekong River Basin 
Floodplain  productivity  and biodiversity 
Wild fish proliferate in the wetland ecosystem that 
is created by the annual flooding of  the Mekong River 
during the southwest monsoon (June-October). In 
Cambodia, the Tonle Sap River flowing from the Great 
Lake to Phnom Penh reverses its direction due to a 
faster rise in Mekong water levels. This results in an 
expansion of tile Great Lake by four to six times (Fig. 
1).  In a similar, though less dramatic way, thousands of 
square kilometers of  floodplain forests and shrub lands 
are temporarily submerged along the Mekong River 
and its tributaries, thereby making abundant food re- 
sources accessible and providing shelter for numerous 
fish species. 
The degree of  floodplain inundation depends on 
the level of  the Mekong floods. Relationships between 
water levels, lake surface extent and flood duration are 
given by Carbonnel and Guiscafr6 (1963) and Tes (1998) 
for the Great Lake Tonle Sap. Fish productivity is posi- 
tively related to the extent of  the lake surface and the 
duration of the flooding. 
When the floods recede, the direction of  the Tonle 
Sap River flow changes again. Water levels on the 
submerged lands start dropping, signaling to most fish 
species that it is time to migrate to deeper water in the 
lake or tributaries (lateral  migration). Many species will 
then undertake longer (longitudinal)  migrations from the 
lake or tributary to the Mekong River, probably mov- 
ingupstream as well as downstream. The large and me- 
dium-scale fisheries are geared to intercept these 
migrations. Longitudinal  migrants constitute about 63% 
of  the total catch taken by these fisheries in the Tonle 
Sap area. 
Many fish species with longitudinal migrations 
begin to spawn in the Mekong River at the beginning 
of  the rainy season (May-July),  when the first flood wa- 
ters are coming in and water levels start rising. Other 
species migrate back from the Mekong up the tributar- 
ies and into the floodplain for spawning. Important 
spawning areas are located in Kratie, Stung Treng and 
Ratanakiri provinces. A large numbers of  fish eggs and 
floodplain areas that are inundated. 
These fish migrations seem to be largely confined to 
the Mekong and its tributaries below the geological fault 
line at the Khone Falls  in the Khong  district 
of  southern Lao PDR. on the border with Cambodia, 
although the extensive rapids and falls (10-15 m) 
allow for the upstream passage of  most species. Data on 
relative abundance are available for most species 
(Duankum et al. 1996a, b; Baird 1998).  However, quantita- 
tive information is lacking, although Baird et al. (1998) in- 
fer from interviews that some 4 000 tare caught in Khong 
district annually (mostly  above the falls).  A large propor- 
tion of  this consists of  species that have migrated up from 
Cambodia.  The existence of  a dai fishery in the Vietnam- 
ese part of  the Mekong suggests that there is also a dry 
season (November-March)  movement downstream out 
of  the Cambodian floodplains. More data on catches and 
species composition are needed. 
Due to geological processes, several river systems 
joined to form the Mekong River. This brought together 
fish faunas that had evolved in different parts (Rainboth 
1996).  At present some 1  200 fish species are known to 
exist in the river system. The 500 species found in Cam- 
bodia are described in Rainboth (1996).  This study will be 
expanded to cover the entire fish fauna of  lower Mekong 
basin. A number of  new species have already been dis- 
covered. While many of  these species have little direct 
commercial value, most are utilized in subsistence (fam- 
ily and ricefield) fisheries. 
The important commercial  species are often broadly 
categorized (MRCS 1992) as: (i)  black fish - species able to 
survive in swamps and plains all year round with limited 
lateral migrations. These are mostly carnivorous and de- 
tritus feeders. This group includes Channidae 
(snakeheads), Clariidae, Bagridae (Mystus sp.) and 
Anabantidae; and (ii)  white fish -most species showing 
strong  lateral andlongitudinal migrations.  This group in- 
cludes many cyprinids, various Pangasius sp.,  Siluridae and 
Notopteridae.  Also included is the group of  small, short- 
lived cyprinids, among which Trey Riel (Henicorhynchus 
sp.)  is the most common. Life cycle research needs to be 
done on these species, including habitat preferences.  It 
should elucidate the role of floods, forests and other wet- 
land areas. 
Fisheries in Cambodia 
Type of fisheries 
The large and medium-scale fisheries require fishing 
licenses, which are estimated to add about US$2 million 
annually to government revenue (Nao and Ly 1997).  Fam- 
ily and ricefield fisheries are unlicensed.  The large-scale 
fisheries have limited access, whereas the other fisheries 
have open access. 
Fishing lots (Ioh nesaat). Fishing lots are concessions 
auctioned by the Cambodian Government to the high- tion in these eight fishing districts alone is more than 280 
000 t (Table 2). Average nationwide  consumption will be 
somewhat lower. 
Fish and rice are the main elements of  food security 
in Cambodia, although fish was not recognized as such 
by the government and by FA0 (MAFF 1996; 1999), as 
only government planning figures were used (i.e., 5-7.5 
kgcapita-layear  -'  of freshwater fish).  A possible conse- 
quence of  this lack of  awareness is that the government 
will neglect the protection and management of the fish 
resources within the country and will fail to give national 
fisheries the appropriate  importance in regional discus- 
sions on water management. 
Discussion 
There are factors threatening the sustainability of  in- 
land capture fisheries from both outside and inside the 
country. 
Water management 
Since the 1950s, thousands of  large and small multi- 
purpose dams with reservoirs and often extensive irri- 
gation schemes have been built in the Mekong 
watershed.  This has led to the fragmentation  of  aquatic 
habitats and the blocking-off of  fish spawning  areas.  The 
cumulative effects that these water management 
schemes have on river flow levels result in additional 
negative impacts. The filling up of  reservoirs tends to 
delay and reduce peak floods, while increasing dry sea- 
son river flows. In the 1980s and 1990s the wet season 
flow was about 15%  lower than normal (MRCS hydro- 
logical database).  Climatic changes were ruled out as an 
explanation  for this (IMC 1992). Reduced peak floods 
result in less inundation of  the floodplains. 
Fish yield appears to change from year to year. 
It is likely that these changes are largely related tovaria- 
tions in the hydrological conditions of  the river. 
The extent of  the flooding (area and duration)  is thought to 
be positively related to fish productivity (Dennis 1987; 
NEDECO 1988; ESCAP 1990) because of  the spawning and 
nursery functions of  the floodplain and the access that fish 
have to food. On average, higher water levels in the 1950s 
and 1960s will have meant a greater abundance of fish than 
at present. This is a widely held view in Cambodia. A delay 
in the timing of  peak flooding may cause it to be out of 
phase with natural occurring cycles of  reproduction,  espe- 
cially for highly migratory fish species whose eggs and fry 
depend on the first floods of  the wet season for transport 
to the floodplains.  Mainstream dams, especially in Cambo- 
dia and Lao PDR, block these vital migratory pathways. 
MRC (1998) used a rough model to predict future  flow 
changes due to potential implementation of  water use 
schemes. It estimates that the river flow at Phnom Penh 
may be further reduced by as much as  15%  in the wet sea- 
son, resulting in a 20%  lower flow towards the Great Lake. 
This would translate into a loss of  20%  of  regularly sub 
merged land, comprising  about 240 000 ha of  the 1.2  mil- 
lion ha presently flooded around the Great Lake (CNMC 
1998). The model estimates that losses will be greater for 
wetlands in Lao PDR and northeastern Cambodia. 
There is an urgent need for improved hydrological 
modeling of  the cumulative effects of water management 
to prdct  flood levels and extent and duration of  the inun- 
dation at various river locations. These models need to be 
linked to habitat distribution  in the wetlands and their fish 
productivity, The botanical and (fish)  faunal diversity of 
floodplains needs to be inventoried and fish productivity 
by habitat type determined. 
Fishery management 
Fishery management is a balancing act between the 
requirements for biologically sustainable resource use, eco- 
nomically optimal exploitation  patterns and their social ac- 
ceptability, The main internal threats are the open access 
nature of  the medium-scale  and family fisheries, their con- 
flict with the fishing  lot system and the destruction of flood- 
plain habitats for rice production and other uses. 
In Cambodia, the fishing lot system has been in place 
for at least 100 years. Largelots are operated through sub 
letting parts to fishers from neighboring  communes (Degen 
and Nao 1998; Gum 1998). Even though concession hold- 
ers fully exploit the fish resources in their lots, they gener- 
ally have a longer term interest. Catches seem to have been 
stable.  Lot operators tend to provide a degree of  protec- 
tion by keeping poachers out and preventing large-scale 
destruction of  the flood forest. 
Open-access in fisheries usually leads to overfishing, 
especially  in  times  of  economic  depression. 
Traditionally, fishing rights that govern fisheries along the 
Mekong and its tributaries inLao PDR and northeast Cam- 
bodia (Stung Treng, Ratanakiri) provided some form of 
protection to local nonmigratory stocks. In places where 
these traditions were reinforced with outside help, fish 
stocks often recovered in a surprisingly short time 
(Baird, pers. comm.). If  resources are to be maintained 
for feeding a growing  population, such traditional rights 
should be firmly anchored in an effective fishery law that 
strengthens  community involvement in fisheries manage 
ment 
The large increase in fishing effort observed in the open- 
access medium-scale and family fisheries may have been 
caused by the improved security and access to the lake, and 
possibly by an influx of  internally displaced persons and 
refugees (380 000 returned in the early nineties), some of 
whom have settled in the lake and river areas (Fig. lo), 
where there is little alternative employment. It is easy to 
take up fishing as the required capital investment is low 
and a license is cheap or not required. Due to the in- 
crease in the number of  fishers, the catch per fisher has 
declined.  Fishers living near fishing lots illegally exploit 
the richer resources of  these lots. This has given rise to 
conflicts. Fishing lot operators  feel they need to employ The paper notes that fisheries are still of  great impor- 
tance for Cambodia and indeed for the entire lower 
Mekong basin in terms of  food security and as an  indus- 
try providing employment and income for millions. In 
view of  (potential) threats posed by increasing fishing ef- 
fort, environmental  degradation and infrastructure devel- 
opments, safeguarding  the present situation requires: 
I  greater public awareness, especially at the decision- 
making level in government  and international  orgaru- 
zations, on the sigruficance  of  fish for food security as 
well as of  the present and potential role of fisheries in 
the economic development  of  the country and of  the 
region; 
I  a functional  platform for dialogue and cooperationbe- 
tween the riparian countries  to be able to timely deal 
with the upcoming fisheries management  issues in a 
timely fashion; 
I  an improved and enlarged capacity for research and 
management.  Databases should contain information on 
the size and economic value of  the fisheries, the pos- 
sible impact of  water management schemes, and their 
biological aspects ('Me cycles, migrations and habitats); 
and 
I  a strengthened role of the fishing lots in habitat protec- 
tion by improving legslation, setting up of  lot man- 
agement bodies and increasing environmental 
awareness of  the stakeholders. 
The Mekong River Agreement signed by Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam in April 1995 provides 
the framework. An overall management concept (Basin 
Development Plan and Water Utilization Program) has 
been developed and relevant actions are proposed includ- 
ing setting up of  a subcommittee for fisheries under the 
MRC Joint  Committee of member nations. 
It is time to act: as the river dominates the lives of  so 
many, they also share her fate. 
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ABSTRACT 
The fishing lot system is based on the traditional  system of  revenue collection prevalent since precolonial 
times, modified and simplified  by the colonial administration.  With the growing ma1  population, confhcts 
over the use of  the resources of  thesevery productive fishing grounds  are increasing. 
Community-based fisheries co.management hasbeen suggested as  an alternative  to thecurrent system 
to allow for the participation  of  communities through delegation of  power and responsibility to lwal authori- 
ties. However, the fisheries management system cannot escape the existing politicaland social  framework of 
pa-ge. 
Thk paper outlines the lustorical, cultural and legal background of  the existing system of  fishinglots in 
Cambodia. It advocates  that fishing lot system be usedas thestarting point in developing improved manage 
ment options. The weakness of  the existing system is not that the lot system do 
butthat  it allows for abuses on the patronside of  relationships. Existing patronclient  relations shouldbe  used 
for  awarenessbuilding  and focus onexploitation  patternsthat allow for sustainable recruitment of  fish stocks. 
The organizational  capacity of  fishers at the village level also needs to be strengthened, including their 
capacity to negotiate with their patrons. 
Introduction 
Since ancient times fishing has been a central ele- 
ment of  Khmer culture, society and economy. The ex- 
traordinary carvings of  the world famous reliefs at 
Angkor Wat testify to this importance.  The very ad- 
vanced culture of  Angkor could only evolve and develop 
in the way it did by counting on rice and fish as the two 
main food staples.  The importance of rice and fish as a 
means of  livelihood for the rural population has not 
changed. Fish is by far the most important  source of pro- 
tein for the 10.7million (NIS 1996) people of  Cambodia, 
of  whom 85%  live in rural areas. The rural economy is 
highly dependent (90.1  %) on primary production such 
as agriculture,  hunting forestry and fishing. 
The river systems of  the Mekong, Bassac, and the 
Tonle Sap Rivers (including  the Great Lake) and their ad- 
jacent extensive floodplains, provide the basis for a sub 
sistence farming-fishing rural society.  The annual 
flooding of large plain areas of  Cambodia, caused by the 
tropical monsoon and the melting snow in the central 
Asian highlands, imposes the yearly rhythm on the ru- 
ral economy. The fluctuations in water supply and flood- 
ing during the year and from year to year demand a 
high degree of flexibility  to be able to benefit from this 
pattern. At the peak of  the rainy season, more than 20 
000 krn2 of  plains, forests, shrub lands, and farmlands 
are under water (IMC 1992).  The efficient use of  the wa- 
ter masses, their currents, and their resources is of  cru- 
cial importance to the livelihood of the people. The water 
is diverted by means of  irrigation  canals, stored through 
dikes or pumped from the rivers into the farmlands to 
obtain higher yields. A great variety of  fishing gears 
and strategies are used to take advantage of  the con- 
stantly changing conditions to minimize fish harvests. 
The management of the freshwater capture fisher- 
ies of  Cambodia is considered to be one of  most devel- 
oped and extensive systems of  fisheries regulation in the 
world (IMC 1992). It comprises large-scale fishing 
operations in well-defined fishing lots and medium-scale 
operations that are licensed and regulated by the De- 
partment of  Fisheries (DoF),  as well as family fisheries. 
The latter can operate in all waterbodies at all times, ex- 
cept in specifically restricted areas. Threats to and pres- 
sures on fish stocks are increasing, as are conflicts 
between the different stakeholders (Ahmed et al. 1998). 
It is necessary to ensure the long-term availability of  fish- 
ery resources to provide food security, income and employment  within the context of an  improved fisher- 
ies management structure. 
Recently the fisheries  management system of  Cam- 
bodia hasbeencritiwd  on  the grounds that the poor fisher 
canhardly make a living. The fishing lot system is con- 
sidered to be responsible for damaging practices 
(Ahmed and Touch 1996; Thuok and Ahmed 1996). The 
open-access to fisheries outside the lots is regarded as 
the main threat to the freshwater capture fisheries in 
Cambodia (Van Zalinge 1997). This has led to recom- 
mendations for community-based fisheries co-manage- 
ment and participation of local communities through 
the delegation  of power and responsibility to local au- 
thorities. The underlying assumption is that the vil- 
lage communities are organized bodies focusing on 
common social, economic, and political interactions. 
The questions that arise from this are: What does 
"community" mean in the Cambodian context? What 
can "community-based co-management"  mean in 
Cambodia? Are the "communities" homogenous and 
harmoniously compact? What is the experience and ca- 
pability of handling common and conflicting interests 
within a community? Who are the players and how is 
the power structure organized? If  a community-based 
management approach is to be a future option, what 
should be the first steps for setting up or strengthen- 
ing organizational structures at the community level? 
How open is the "open-access" to fisheries? How dam- 
aging are the existing fishing practices to fish stocks? 
What kind of  exploitation patterns will help to conserve 
resources? 
To make improvements in the management sys- 
tem requires a deeper understanding of  the fishing lot 
system as well as the organizational capacity of  the fish- 
ing  communities  and their visions of  sustainability This 
includes not only legal structure  but also existing in- 
formal management practices. 
This paper is written in the context of international 
fisheries development  cooperation in which a regional 
organization (Mekong  River Commission) provides ad- 
vice to the fisheries authorities of  the Cambodian 
Government on training staff in fisheries research, set- 
ting up databases and developing options for the sus- 
tainable management of  freshwater capture fisheries. 
The data presently available allow only for some initial 
insights into these issues. After more than a quarter 
century of  civil war in which most of  the historical docu- 
mentation disappeared and no research was done, gov- 
ernment staff have to be trained to be able to conduct 
research on issues relevant to fisheries management. 
This paper aims to contribute to the process of 
refining research questions and defining concepts for 
designing feasible options for fisheries management 
appropriate to the environmental, cultural, and 
institutional-political conditions prevailing in Cambo- 
dia. 
The Khmer Village Community 
General key elements 
The Khmer term phum, which has been translated 
into English as "village", has slightly different conno- 
tations than the translation reveals. It is not only a po- 
litical administrative unit, but also means a hamlet or 
section of  a village or any inhabited space, even if  it 
has only one house (Ebihara 1968; Ovesen et al. 1996). 
The pagoda or wat may express the social unit of  a 
phum, though several phum  frequently share one 
temple.  One of  the central characteristics of  Khmer 
rural communities is the lack of  indigenous, traditional, 
organized associations,  clubs, factions, or other groups 
that are formed on a non-kin principles (Ebihara 1968). 
As there are no integrating institutions such as com- 
munal houses, and there are no communal properties, 
the Wat assumes a unifying f~mction  to tackle commu- 
nity matters.  Traditional Khmer society is deeply 
rooted in the culture of  Angkor and is principally hier- 
archical. The success of  the Khmer peasants in produc- 
tion and reproduction is considered to be directly linked 
to the protection and security available through the 
supreme cosmological position of the King (Ovensen 
1998). This is a classic patron-client relationship. Be- 
tween the King and the farmer there is a long chain of 
feudal collaborators to facilitate this relationship, of- 
ten arbitrarily. 
This pattern of rural organization was largely un- 
affected by the French Protectorate (1863-1953). Despite 
civil wars, Pol Pot times, multiple ideological indoctri- 
nation attempts and the United Nations Transitional Au- 
thority on Cambodia's  (UNTAC) well-intentioned 
introduction of  democratic election procedures in Cam- 
bodia, the structures of  patronage remain (Ovesen  et 
al. 1996; Vijghen and Sareoun 1996). Not only do they 
remain, they were probably strengthened by the need 
for more security and protection that people longed 
for. As a guiding social element in society, these pa- 
tron-client relations are sid  in place today and are the 
"backbone of  the political structure in Cambodia" (Ovesen 
1998). 
During UNTAC times, more than 380 000 displaced 
persons were resettled in areas that provided relative se- 
curity and protection from Khmer Rouge forces on the 
one hand and some economic opportunities for survival 
on the other. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR ) advertisement and the Governments' 
promise of  land options succeeded in attracting  hundreds 
of  thousands of  displaced persons into resettlement pro- 
grams. They failed, however, in effectively providing them 
with land (Greve 1993). The resettled people survived on 
the availability of  and access to abundant common re- 
sources based mainly in the floodplains  (CNMC/ 
NEDECO/MIDAS 1998). The process of  integration into 
the new community was extremely difficult (Baron 1996), 
and those who succeeded in rebuilding their lives were tral DoF from Phnom Pen.  allocated itself two lots, while 
other government departments (such as the Commerce 
Department) and provinces with no fishing  grounds like 
Kampong Speu, fished the other lots (Swift 1997). Since 
the capacity of  the governmental  agencies to fish was un- 
derdeveloped,  a successive subleasing  of the lots was nec- 
essary to obtain revenues and financial support for the 
admirustration (IMC 1992). The traditional patron-client 
system probably proved very useful in running the lots 
(Vijghen  and Sareoun 1996). 
The review of the legal ordinances  from prewar times 
resulted in the Fiat Law of  Fishery of  1987.  It confirmed 
the fishing lot system as the most important management 
tool for inland fisheries. The income DoF derived from 
selling  concessions of fishing  lots is around two-thirds of 
its total budget @OF  19%). The extent of vested political 
and economic interest in the fishing industry hampers the 
government in the protection of fishery resources, in spite 
of  its legal power to control access to the fisheries. 
Fishing lot management 
Fishing lots continue to be big business as well as a 
major source of  declared and undeclared tax collection, 
framed within a sociopolitical system of  patronage. 
The lot owner 
Most of  the present lot owners have been running 
their lots for two or even more concession periods (Luco 
1997; Swift 1997). Lot #13 of Kandal province has been 
operated by the same lot owner since 1985. During the 
bidding process the incumbent lot owners have an advan- 
tage over new bidders. This advantage stems from: (i) 
ownership of  the right equipment for operating the lot; 
(ii) possession of  extensive empirical knowledge about the 
real productivity of  the lot (which is likely to differ sub 
stantially from the officially reported one); (iii)  experience 
in management of  a complicated patron-client financing 
system in which several levels of leasers and less economi- 
cally powerful medium and small-scale fishers participate; 
and (iv)  empirical  knowledge about the local social sys- 
tems of behavior of  poachers, relations of fisheries  offic- 
ers, efficient protection mechanisms for the fishing lot and 
other key information. These advantages translate into 
lower transaction costs, such as the costs of  acquiring  in- 
formation, negotiating contracts and enforcing them. 
Participants in  lot operations 
The Burden Books follow a standardized 12-article 
scheme. They give details of  the operation of  each fishing 
lot in the country,  There is enough flexibility for each fish- 
ing lot owner to arrange specific agreements  with local 
stakeholders like the police, military, fisheries officers, in- 
spectors, fishingpatrols,  navigation police, district authori- 
ties, fisher groups, as well as individual fishers. The lot 
owner usually agrees on subcontracts prior to the auction 
in order to collect the starting capital for the bidding (one- 
third of  the base amount for bidding has to be deposited 
with the DoF in advance). The organizational chart of the 
fishing lots actually differs from lot to lot. There might be 
only one "lot owner fishing operator", which is predomi- 
nantly the case in the dai (or bagnet) fisheries. There might 
also  be a "lot owner and share holder company" followed 
by various "subleasers nonfishing  operators" at one or 
two levels, and a sizeable number of  "subsub  and sub 
subsubcontradors fishing operators". Even these opera- 
tors may sell small fishing  rights bun  chalat) on a tempo- 
rary basis and with well-defined spatial limitations to 
fishers operating with small gears. Fishing lot # 19  from 
Takeo province is one concrete example of  an  existing or- 
ganizational and fee structure (Table 3). 
In riverine and lacustrine lots, the organizational  struc- 
ture tends to be more complex than in dai lots or in river 
sandbank lots, which are  much more easily controlled by 
a single fishing operator. The subdivision  of the lot into 
smaller fishing domains constitutes  an efficient way of 
controlling the fishing lot, whereby control is handed over 
to somebody in exchange for a negotiated payment. Most 
of  the riverine-lacustrine lots contain specially designated 
common property areas (specified in the Burden Book) 
for communal fishing activities with small gears. In prac- 
tice, these areas are often inaccessible as they are  scattered 
The use of  damaging and even illegal fishing gear 
within and outside fishing lots has frequently been re- 
ported (IMC 1992; Ahmed 19%; Luco 1997; Swift 1997; Van 
Zalinge 1997; Ahmed et al. 1998; CNMC/NEDECO/ 
MIDAS I%%). On the other hand, little attention  has been 
given to the protection activities of lot owners and fishers 
(Swift 1997). Some current protection measures for fish- 
ery resource are: (i) fishing lot owners and operators  pro- 
tect the flooded forest against encroachment, especially 
in the northern part of  the country in the lake lots of  the 
Tonle Sap Great Lake; (ii) despite the two-year auctioning 
cycle, the practice of long-term engagement  in fishing lot 
operation promotes a longer-term resource exploitation 
perspective. Lot owners usually operate with minor fish- 
ing gears during  the so-called closed season and they pro- 
tect the flooded forests in that period; (iii) it has been 
observed that fishers and lot owners do  not always 
pump drying ponds, whether they are common prop- 
erty areas within the fishing lot or not; and (iv)  lots 
are fished during a specific period of  the fishing sea- 
son. Outside this period, large-scale fishing gears are 
not used and fish can move freely. 
In Takeo province, there is virtually no flood for- 
est left. This is mainly due to the expansion of  rice 
area and also to the harvesting of juvenile trees and 
brushes to be used in illegal brush traps (samras). It 
has been observed that at the beginning of  the fish- 
ing season in December, a large amount of  brush is 
shipped into the fishing areas to be used in samras. In 
the Vietnamese province of  Long An, situated in the 
floodplains of  the Mekong and Vam Co Rivers, the prac- 
tice of  samras is being abandoned as brush is becoming 
too expensive. Table 3. Fishing operators, divisions, fee structure and sublease arrangements  in Takeo Fishing Lot#l9, 1997. 
(Sub)  Lasing  Lot areal  Residence of  Type of  Other lease and sublease arrangements 
leaser  price paid  section  fishingoperator  fishingoperation 
fisher  toowner 
(Riel)' 
A  700 000  #I  Kampong  Leav  Daay Tube  Leaser also had to  pay 150 000 riel to  Kandal province 
village  village  net (large-scale)  fisheries officials. (This section is located within 
Kandal province, but belongs to  the fisheries office in 
Takeo province.) 
B  270 000  #Z  Preik  Ta Hing  Barrage 
village 
- 
C  400000  #3  Kampong Preah  Pond  Kampong Reap commune 
village 
D  Free!  #I7  Canal  The local police  get this operation  without payingthe 
(In return  lot  owner. They resell it to  Vietnamese  fisher who 
for security)  uses a barrage at the mouth of Prammuey Mekara 
canal. 
E  600000  #I  Kampong Leav  Subowner sold fishing rights (pun cralat) plus fished 
village  by himself. 
F  1400000  #5  Kampong Leav 
#6  village 
Leaser is uncle of E (above). The subowner sold the 
southern part of his section (Ref. 4%)  to  two  people in 
Kampong Leavvillage for 400 000 riel, plus sdd pun cralat 
and fished himself. 
- 
G  Unb  #7  This section is divided into many small strips sold to 
people in nearby villages. 
H  2 500 000  $a  Kampong Reap  The subowner sold the southern part of his section 
#3  village  (Ref. # 9) to  someone in his village for 150 000 riel; 
#I 0  Kro  Bay (Ref.#  1 O),  also to  someone in his village. He 
sold the pond for 400 000 riel and pun cralat  in the 
remaining section (Ref. # 8) plus fished there himself. 
I  150000  #I I  Kampong Preah 
village 
1  150000  #I2  Kampong Preah 
village 
Healso  bought Pou Chenna pond. 
K  150000  #I3  Tuol Chan Toek  Canal  (Preik Sdei commune) 
village 
- 
L  150000  #I4  PreikSdei commune  The owner sold 100-m  wide stripes along the 
#I5  mouth of the Stoeng Angkor Borei River (Ref. # 14) 
for an unknown  total riel. He  sold fishingrights in 
the rest of the section (pun cralat, Ref. #I  5), and 
sold rights to  various canals. In addition, he fished 
in the two  ponds in the section, Sena Dek Cho and 
BoengTraw. 
M  3600000  #I6  Preik Sdei commune  The owner sells pun cralat for a short time duringthe 
open season only. During  closed season, the owner 
above (L) sells pun cralat. He  sells some canals for an 
unknown amount He  also uses a barrage with net at 
Stoeng Sandaek, and pumps out a canal and some small 
ponds. 
N  3 Chi  # 18  Prey Thmey commune  Fished-out pond at PreikTa Nun. 
>  13  700 000 (compared  to  official auction price 
of 12 350 000 riel) 
Source: Swift 1997: annex &own adaptation. 
I US$ I  = 2 500 riel at time of data collection 
US$400  = 10 chi = I riel. fee for their gears rather than  - 
ther discrimination. 
Conclusions 
The overall framework of  cultural, economic and 
political processes of  Cambodia limits the options for 
sustainable management of fisheries.  The patron-client 
relationship makes "community participation" in the 
western sense impractical. The weakness of  the system 
is not that it does not work or might be too inefficient, 
but rather that it is arbitrary and allows for abuse. 
Fishing is strictly a rural activity and one of  a num- 
ber of  activities to obtain food, income and employ- 
ment. Improvements in one production activity may 
translate into a negative impact on another. For ex- 
ample, increasing rice production by intensifying the 
use of  chemical pesticides might have a negative im- 
pact on the productivity of  fish in the ricefields and 
eventually  threaten food security, Thus, an integrated 
approach is necessary. 
Fisheries management is fundamentally  concerned 
with the stakeholders' capacity to communicate  and ne- 
gotiate common and differing interests in fisheries 
while preserving the recruitment capacity of  the fish 
stocks. The importance of  fisheries relative to other 
activities obviously depends on alternative  production 
opportunities outside the sector. The capacity to ana- 
lyze impacts on the fisheries environment, to commu- 
nicate interests, to organize interest groups, to 
negotiate agreements and plan sustainable develop- 
ment is not fishery-specific but belongs to the broader 
framework of  self-help capacity. Rural development 
programs are essentially concerned with the enhance- 
ment of  the self-help capacity of  rural organizations and 
institutions. 
The fishing lot system covers the main inland fish- 
ing areas of  the country. Improvements in the man- 
agement of  fisheries have to be addressed within and 
through this system.  Community-based management 
as usually envisioned may well be impractical in Cam- 
bodia. It is unrealistic to expect that community-based 
management structures that have been successful else- 
where can simply be replicated here (Kurien 1988; 
Hannesson 1998). Co-management, where the re- 
source users at different levels of  responsibility take 
decisions and actions to safeguard the recruitment ca- 
pacity of  fish stocks, seems to be a more promising 
approach. 
The patron-client relationship should be used for 
strengthening  knowledge of  exploitation  patterns that 
allow for sustainable recruitment of  stocks. This will 
strengthen the fishers' capacity to organize  themselves 
and monitor levels of  resource exploitation and pro- 
tect fish stocks. It will also strengthen their capacity to 
negotiate their position within paternalistic and unequal 
relationships. Improvement of  management within the 
patron-client relationship does not rule out interven- 
tion focusing on strengthening the self-help capacity 
of  villagers (Aschrnoneit  et al. 1997). 
Improving fisheries management has to be ad- 
dressed through the fishing lot system. In much the 
same way as the French Protectorate "introduced" the 
fishing lot system, its radical "abolishment" in favor 
of  an engineered community-based management sys- 
tem is not likely to result in any real changes in the 
methods or people involved. The system should be 
used as a starting point to address resource steward- 
ship. The existence of  common property areas within 
the fishing lot system, and as defined in the Burden 
Book of  specific fishing lots, could provide a potentially 
good platform for communication and negotiation on 
access rights and sustainable  resource management. 
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ABSTRACT 
Community-based management of common resources has increasingly  been recogruzed by govem- 
ment agencies in the Lao PDR. Since the late l98Os, government  policy on natural resources management 
has been reexamined as part of a complete  and fundamental overhaul of the legislative framework  to de- 
volve natural resource management  rights and responsibilities to local communities. The new resource 
management policy and resource  tenurerelated  legslation is embedded in broader development principles 
such as the consolidation  of macroeconomic reforms, the improvement of public sector performance, the 
improvement  in living standards  of the whole population and the abatement of natural murce  degradation. 
While resource exploitation and degradation  have accelerated with the reforms introduced by way of 
the New Economic Mechanism, there have been concomitant  changes in murces  useand management A 
decentralization policy on resowe  management  has been  introduced in the form of allocating resources (land 
and forest) that  were previously administered directly by thestate to local authorities  and individuals. 
Very few investigations of policy implementation for community-based resources  management  have 
been carried out. Several of these have been conducted by the Department of Forestry within the Lao 
Muustry of Agriculture and Forestry through different donor-supported programs and pro]&.  This paper 
will highlight recent experiences  in the implementation of the new national resource management and land 
use allocation policies through case studies  which reveal the implications for both local and national govem- 
Introduction 
Since 1989, the government  has issued new resource 
management legislation with an emphasis on rising lev- 
els of  responsibility and stewardship  among  the popula- 
tion, and promoting awareness of costs as well as benefits 
of  resource exploitation. Particular attention has been 
made to stufhng cultivation and illicit lopg.  At the same 
time, provincial, district and village level participation in 
resource conservation  and management have been pro- 
moted, as has a sense of local ownership. Such owner- 
ship is not based on legal title but on an acceptance by the 
government of  de facto rights of  management by local 
people. This, in turn, is based on the State's awareness  of 
its limited capacity to manage at the local level, leading to 
an approach that emphasizes co-management in the use 
and conservation of  natural resources. 
In the absence of  prior experience of  this type, local 
government officials have considerable difficulty in achiev- 
ing the potential for more effective and sustainable re- 
source use based on local systems of  common property 
management. It has proved difficult to bridge the gap 
between legislative intentions, the implementing  regula- 
tions at the national level, and their interpretation and 
implementation  at the local administrative  levels. So far 
the regulation reaches the local level (district and village) 
through the dissemination of paper documents that are 
interpreted differently  by different localities. Central au- 
thorities are quite limited in their capacity to manage re- 
sources locally due to lack of  personnel and funds. 
The case studies provide a better understanding of 
the special conditions of  common property management 
at the community level, and can provide feedback to the 
local governments for implementing national policy. Ac- 
cording to the leplation  related to natural resource man- 
agement, some form of  co-management of  natural 
resources has been in existence. Traditional customs, rules 
and structures, in which local people have individually and 
collectively played a significant role in conserving 
and managing resources, are seen as a basis for local participation in resource management, particularly in ar- 
eas long used for settlement and agriculture. In many 
cases, resource exploitation is regulated by traditional be- 
liefs. For example, trees are  believed to house the spirit of 
dead ancestors and this deters villagers from excessive log- 
gmg. Apart from land and forest resources, water is an- 
other commonmanagement  and conservation interest at 
the local level. Upper watershed areas are usually pro- 
tected, particularly if  they are at the head of  streams that 
feed local irrigation  systems.  Traditional water manage- 
ment is also long-standing in the form of small-scale  weirs 
and channel construction  and maintenance, together with 
rules of  water allocation. Nevertheless, considerable work 
is required to bring traditional and state  management sys- 
tems closer together if  co-management is to work effec- 
tively.  This also requires an understanding of  ethnic 
differences inland, water and forest management. Tradi- 
tional forms of  resource tenure and management haveyet 
to fully receive formal recognition. At the same time the 
tools to assist local resource management are still being 
learned and requires some testing with different cultural 
conditions of  the ethic people. 
Several of  the case studies involve different districts 
within the strategically important and prominent Nam 
Ngum watershed incentral Lao PDR, where district offi- 
cials were specially trained in participatory community- 
based resource planning methods. (Paek, Phoukood, 
Vangviang and Long sane districts). Some tools and meth- 
ods are introduced to district officers or evenvillagers to 
collect necessary data and information  for analysis. This 
will help identify how the resources are to be managed 
and used sustainably for the future. 
Background 
The Lao PDR  is a small, landlocked country in 
Southeast Asia.  The country was established in 
1975 after three decades of  fighting for independence. 
Since 1986, economic reforms announced by the Lao gov- 
ernment under the title New Economic Mechanism have 
sigrufied a shift from a command economy towards 
a market economy. 
Most productive activities in Lao PDR have been 
heavily dependent on the country's natural resources. At 
the local level, people's lives are mostly subsistence-ori- 
ented, with economic activities  based on land, forest and 
water resources. At the national level, dependence on 
these resources is also high. The country's most obvious 
comparative advantage is thus in its natural resource base, 
notably its forests. 
With the high economic dependence on natural re- 
sources, the government  is faced with the difficult task of 
simultaneously promoting natural development,  taking 
care of  livelihood requirements and maintaining a careful 
and balanced approach to resource management. 
The key challenge is promoting sustainable use of 
resources, both to serve  local needs and enhance national 
income. 
The importance of land, water and forest resources 
to the economy is evident in the fact that, whereas agri- 
culture  accounts for only 15%  of  national export income, 
it makes up more than 40%  of GDP. Of  course, much of 
this lies outside the cash economy. Conversely, forestry 
contributes about 40%  of export earnings and 15%  of  GDP 
(World Bank 1993).  Development of  forest and water re- 
sources is one of  the main priorities of  the government. 
In particular, hydropower is targeted as the base for 
both national industrial development and increasing 
foreign exchange earnings. 
Although the country has only 4.5 million inhabitants 
on a land area of  236 800 km2,  90 % of  the land area is made 
up of rugged uplands. Soil fertility is generally low. About 
80%  of  the population live in remote rural areas and shift- 
ing cultivation is a major practice. 
Laotians are made up of  several ethnic groups. 
The diversity of  ethnic groups is simplified officially by 
division into highlanders (Hmong), uplanders (Lao 
theung) and lowlanders (Lao  loum). Livelihood varies by 
ethnic group, but also within groups. Most of  the land 
with potential has already been occupied, and lowlanders 
have access to the most fertile and easily irrigable wet rice 
land. The largest highland minority is the Hmong, who 
believe in animism, practice shifting cultivation, and who 
migrated from Southern China in the 19th century, 
Since the establishment of  Lao PDR, the government 
has issued and disseminated rules and regulations on re- 
source use. Until recently, however, little attention had 
been given to questions of  resource tenure or prohibited 
land uses.  This was because, under the economic 
conditions prevailing after the wartime destruction and 
displacements,  emphasis was placed on local self-suffi- 
ciency at the provincial and even district levels. Most 
measures and resource management programs were ap 
plied flexibly, with priority given to catering  basic eco- 
nomic and immediate livelihood rehabilitation needs 
following the war. Normally, cooperatives established 
under the socialist system treated resources as common 
property. In fact, poor management meant that coopera- 
tives were often a pretext for open-access to resources as 
individuals  struggled to rebuild their lives. Often this led 
to a rapid degradation  of  the local resource base, and an 
abandonment  of  existing traditional resource conserva- 
tion and management practices. In the case of  large-scale 
resource development, planning was centralized, with 
no community involvement except to inform local 
people of  decisions made.  Local people had no role 
in planning such resource exploitation or reaping any of 
the benefits. Under the cooperative  system, perhaps the 
main constraint on resource exploitation was the limited 
development of  markets, restricting the extent to which 
resources became commodities.  Likewise, economic 
isolation and stagnation  held back large-scale forest and 
hydropower exploitation. usually do not recognize the rules of  the indigenous 
communities. ~nstead'the~  have encroached and exploited 
the resource that the indigenous communities  have pro- 
tected and conserved. Most of  the conserved and pro- 
tected forest areas and watersheds retain and regulate 
water for the lower paddy fields. Typically, where new 
and indigenous communities exist, conflict of resource ten- 
ure and utilization has occurred (e.g.,  the forest resources 
in HuaiNyaang,  Namon, Nam Phao and Mouang  Soum). 
Land  use 
Paddy land is considered the most important land use 
unit for all communities in the watershed. So far, rice is 
still a major staple crop for all Lao people. Meanwhile the 
potential land for paddy development is geographically 
limited and scarce. In most cases, arable land in lowland 
areas is occupied by lowlanders and customary rights to- 
ward this land have been recognized by individuals and 
communities nearby. Shifting cultivation is another land 
use practice that is generally done in most upland areas. 
Though lowlanders are engaged in paddy cultivation, 
many of them still practice shifting cultivation for supple- 
mentary crops (even rice). More than half of  the popula- 
tion in the study areas has practiced shifting cultivation. 
As population increases in both lowland and upland 
ethnic groups, the requirement for land also increases. 
Comparing  the present population with the area of  paddy 
fields, the ratio is about 20 persons per hectare of  paddy 
land where the yield of 1  ha is about 2 t. Currently, rice 
production is insufficient when compared to the require- 
ment of  the population. Supplementary  rice production 
has been made through shifting  cultiva  tion. The new gov- 
ernment policy limits slash and bum cultivation for three 
years in order to promote land development in rural ar- 
eas as well as to diminish encroachment  of  natural for- 
ests. The present extension service is poor. Upland 
cultivation remains unsustainable because soil and land 
use in sloping areas lack soil improvement and 
conservation.  This results in decreased yield when farm- 
ers grow crops in the same plot for more than two sea- 
sons. 
In rural areas, where shifting  cultivation practices still 
continue in the uplands, land use conflicts are cornmon- 
place. Land resources are considered and understood by 
local people as common property, where villagers have 
the customary rights to claim and use the land based on 
the capability of  the family labor in clearing and develop- 
ing the land. Shifting  cultivation is considered as a sus- 
tained farming  system if the land area is sufficient to rotate 
the practice from 10  to 15  years. However, due to popu- 
lation growth, the rotation is shortened and the suitable 
land becomes scarce and cannot absorb this cultivation 
practice anymore. Shifting  cultivation has always has been 
practiced on tops and along the edges of  the mountains 
where water source for lowland paddy in the lower slopes 
originates. This results in land use conflicts  between com- 
munities and households who use the land for cultivation 
in different geographic patterns. In some case (Namon/ 
Huai Nyaang and Nam Phao/Mouang Soum), land use 
conflict is related to paddy expansion and water resource 
availability for paddy expansion. 
Forest management 
The forests are an important source of  food, medi- 
cine, cons!xuctionmaterial  and income for the rural  popu- 
lation. Usually, local people use forest products in their 
daily livelihood. However, some nontimber forest prod- 
ucts are in high demand in both local and international 
markets. This results in the exploitation  of forest products 
due to open-access. Resource exploit-ation to satisfy mar- 
ket demand creates competition  at different  levels: be- 
tween individuals  in a community, between two or more 
communities, and between outsiders  and the local com- 
munity, Forest resources in the local context and in the 
present situation are considered common property.  Their 
utilization is controlled  by district (or central) and com- 
munity regulations. Meanwhile the customary rights of 
local people are recognized through the regulation of  natu- 
ral resource management at the national level. 
In 1994, the new policy on territory based-manage- 
ment and administration  village boundary demarcation 
was introduced as a first step to land allocation and land 
use zoning at the village level. In practice, each village 
should identdy its own territory for management and 
administrative purposes, in effect carrying cut land use 
zoning  for forests, agriculture  and infrastructure at the 
village level. The intended output is a village-level land 
use plan. In the case of  Namon and Huai Nyaang, the two 
communities have not reached an agreement to divide 
the territory. Instead, they propose that there not be a 
boundary between the two communities because Namon 
villagers are afraid that they will lose their rights to use 
forest resources that have been claimed by Huai Nyaang 
villagers. Due to the different temporal occupation on for- 
est resource between Namon and Huai Nyaang villages, 
the two communities cannot settle the village boundary, 
especially forest demarcation issues.  However, Huai 
Nyaang people also claim that without their management 
and protection, those forests will be cut down by other 
villagers and small traders who try to encourage people 
to cut and sell the trees. 
Experience from the study area indicates that market 
opportunities also create competition in resource use. 
When management guidelines are missing, resource ex- 
ploitationwill exceed the rate of  growth and will result in 
the degradation  and unsustainable use of  such resources 
since an over-control of  utilization has changed the per- 
ception of  the resources from being common property to 
open access. For instance, fishing in Nam Ngum reser- 
voir persisted despite rules and regulations against fish- 
ing in spawning  grounds. The same experience  happened 
with the gathering of  nontimber forest products like rat- 
tan, bamboo, cadamon, aromatic wood and others. There 
were no rules developed at the village level in collecting and exploiting these resources. This situation reflects the 
conflict between newcomers and the old community in 
terms of rights to use the forest. It indicates to the ce&al 
policy authorities that it is not always necessary that each 
community  has its own territory for resource manage- 
ment. It means that the community itself can make deci- 
sions whether the resource should be divided or jointly 
managed as community common property. 
Water resources 
Water use is now becoming a new issue for commu- 
nities who use water for irrigating  paddy fields. People 
who have lowland paddy as well as upland paddy areas 
are now blaming people who practice shifting cultivation 
along mountain slopes  where the water origmates. Fur- 
thermore, conflict in water use between paddy owners at 
the top of  the weir and at the end of  the weir prompts the 
need to share  and distribute the water, especially during 
the transplanting  period when a large volume of water is 
needed at the same  time. 
Training Local Authorities 
in Natural Resource Management 
Potential and limitations 
The village community is the most basic adrmnistra- 
tive unit. The committee and village leaders are elected 
by the villagers. Village-level resource management is 
grassroots-based and involves direct resource users; it 
takes advantage of  traditional management systems. 
However, its key limitation is the absence of  authority 
when dealing with inter-village disputes, disputes  with 
outside resource claimants such as loggers, and, in some 
cases, even within the community. Conflicts arise due to 
the diversity of  interests within individual communities 
and they require higher (district)  arbitration. According 
to present resource management policies, local commu- 
nity involvement in resource management decisions is 
given a priority. However, community participation in re- 
source demarcation and management also requires that 
property rights to the resources are redefined and pro- 
tected. 
The district is an important  level in resource manage- 
ment due to its status  as the unit of the bureaucracy that is 
closest to the resource users. Most personnel employed 
at the district offices are residents of  the area under their 
jurisdiction. However, district level limitations include a 
shortage of  relevant personnel, high turnover in some 
districts, lack of  experience and appropriate training and, 
above all, inadequate  resources. 
In Lao PDR, the capacity of  the village authorities and 
committees for resolving conflict is considered to be good 
(Kirk 1996). However, in some cases, conflicts have re- 
mained hanging in the balance for many years. The con- 
flict between villages when it comes to rules is said to be 
difficult  to resolve due to the reluctance to upset long-ex- 
isting relations between communities. However, conflict 
resohion  at the village level has two aspects. One is reli- 
ance on the traditional practice, where the senior commit- 
tee in the village is consulted and gives recommends  tions 
to resolve the conflict. Another is reliance on the adrnin- 
istrative  channel, where any conflict that cannot be solved 
by the ViUage is sent to the district and follows the judicial 
system. 
Presently, the district level officials in charge of  re- 
source  management lack the experience  and skills for re- 
source management, especially in organizing the local 
people in the process. Part of  the experience in the Nam 
Ngum watershed involves training these officials, who 
have different technical backgrounds. The purpose of  the 
training is to guide them in the process of resource man- 
agement and utilization. The training is followed by field 
implementation. How ever, the process needs to be sus- 
tained and follow-up activities  need to be done. Building 
capacity at the village level has to be encouraged for long- 
term program sustainability. This can be done by training 
local people in both theory and field practice in order to 
create awareness  of local key stakeholders  in sustainable 
resource management, conservation and development. 
Tools and Methods 
Maps are a useful tool in helping local people idenbfy 
their own resources and management needs. The Nam 
Ngum experience of  using a simple map that was pre- 
pared together with local communities  provided satisfac- 
tory results in helping local authorities and people to 
identdy resource use and decide the course of  manage- 
ment. Although the tenurial system is not yet fully real- 
ized and implemented, this tool can nevertheless guide 
local people in defining their farming areas, forests for 
conservation, protection and production, and areas to be 
reserved for future use by the communities. 
Organizing  exchange  visits between farmers allows 
them to exchange experiences and ideas. A study tour for 
farmers and local staff to other countries in the region 
where the living conditions and development  trends are 
similar (e.g., northern Thailand)  perhaps strengthens  the 
resolve and adds to the knowledge of  farmers and local 
staff in the conduct of  their own resource management 
practices. This method can only be used in cases where 
the project has enough funds and resources. 
Small revolving funds for local communities is a key 
project support  mechanism. Buffalo bank was established 
to provide funds to Longkone in Xiang Khouang prov- 
ince. Two areas in Namphao and Namon were also eu- 
tended schemes of  revolving funds. Based on the initial 
evaluation, the revolving fund has resulted in an end to 
further  forest clearance and has significantly  enhanced 
food security for the villages. This intervention was the 
catalyst for a participatory land-use planning exercise that 
has achieved a strong community consensus in identdy- ing areas for maintaining forest cover for other uses as 
well as setting  aside areas for agricultural production. 
Conclusion 
Resource management capacity-building at the com- 
munity level needs the understanding, participation and 
a common consensus in methods, rules and utilization. 
The experience and traditional knowledge can be used as 
basis for the development of  any rules and regulations in 
community resource management. The practice of  re- 
source demarcation and management requires institu- 
tional and personnel capability,  Currently, resource 
management is relying on some key individuals. Ensur- 
ing the continuity of  district programs has  beena key prob 
lem due to frequent staff changes and changes in the 
mandate of  the organizations. 
Short training courses and study  tours provide con- 
siderable benefits to local staff and community leaders. 
w  Resource allocation and local community intervention 
for better management are necessary and these strate- 
gies have been supported  by government policy. Re- 
source management and demarcation initiatives  were 
anticipated to help ease conflicts over and degradation 
of  forests, land and water resources. 
s  The level of  awareness of  community responsibility for 
resource stewardship has increased substantially, and 
among village leaders there is a sense of  accountability 
for the condition of forests within village boundaries. 
Boundary demarcation is ill fitted to existing 
resource use and management practices especially in 
Namon and Huai Nyaang. 
w  Present policies on resource allocation need to adapt to 
the differences among ethnic groups. 
w  Resource management by local involvement and par- 
ticipation needs economic intervention  in terms of  live- 
lihood  development and improvement. The 
intervention  should start with small-scale enterprises 
that fit local conditions. Large-scale intervention is also 
necessary in order to provide conditions for creating 
more sustainable  land use practices within a participa- 
tory resource planning framework. 
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